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The case studies investigate political bargaining as well as innovation processes 
around efforts to reduce environmental pollution in pulp production. The development 
and diffusion of corresponding environmental technologies depend on their technical 
viability, their economic viability, the (global) socioeconomic structures of the pulp and 
paper industry, environmental policy regulations, and situational circumstances, 
reflecting the interests and relative power of act rs involved. Taking into account a time 
period of nearly 30 years (1970 - 2000) various innovative efforts are summarized. 
These environmental innovations are examples of different approaches and foci to deal 
with environmental problems of pulp production by appropriate technologies, namely 
wastewater purification by aluminium oxide or by combined aerobic and anaerobic 
biological treatment, substitution of molecular chlorine bleaching by peroxide bleaching 
or by high pressure oxygen bleaching, and altern tive pulping technologies, i.e. the 
ASAM process and the Organocell process. Because structural framework conditions, 
particularly the availability of public funds, left considerable scope of action, situational 
conditions often paved the way for starting an environmental R&D project and for its 
success or failure. 
In the 1970s the (perceived) pressure of environmental problems was so strong that 
environmental regulation of pulp production was considered necessary. Because of 
fierce competition on the world market, however, the pulp industry could hardly afford 
on a short- erm basis the investments required for environmental protection measures 
without public subsidies. Therefore, ETP contributed significant funding to allow for the 
development of a considerable number of technological options in the 1970s and 
1980s. Most of them failed, however, for various reasons, but some of them succeeded 
to become established practice since about the 1990s. EP and ETP played a key role 
in achieving large reductions of ecologically hazardous substances emitted during pulp 
production, by introducing a wastewater levy, by setting increasingly tighter 
environmental (emission and ambient quality control) standards, and by funding the 
development of corresponding environmental technologies. A good deal of coordination 
of EP and ETP took place, which influenced both the standard setting process and 
technology development. 
Whereas EP activities met fierce opposition of the pulp and paper industry in the 1970s 
and 1980s, involvement in related bargaining processes, in conjunction with an 
increasing environmental concern and a corresponding greening of industry in general, 
led to social learning processes of this industry which resulted in growing commitment 
and a voluntary declaration in favour of ecologically sound pulp producti n in the 
1990s. A campaign of Greenpeace attacking environmental problems of pulp and paper 
production and public debate on chlorine-f ee paper probably enhanced this change in 
attitude. However, the corresponding actual demand of publishers for chlorine-free 
paper and clear environmental regulations were the main driving forces for improved 
environmental protection and consciousness in pulp production. 
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Thus, different phases of development with varying attitudes and approaches of the 
main actors towards environmental protection and technology development in pulp 
production can be distinguished: environmental problem pressure and installation of 
available (end-of-pipe) technologies (1970-1980), generous public funding of envi-
ronmental technology development and preparation of environmental regulation (1975-
1985), passing and enhancing environmental standards and diffusion of environm tal 
innovations (1980-1995), further progress and differentiation of environmental 
regulation and environmental technologies applied (1990-2000). These changing 
contextual conditions implied differing policy strategies and tactics of EP and ETP. 
 1 Purpose and methodology of the case studies 
These case studies investigate political bargaining as well as innovation processes 
around efforts to reduce environmental pollution in pulp production.1 The development 
and diffusion of corresponding environmental technologies relate to the three steps of 
pulping by cooking wood chips with chemicals, pulp bleaching, and subsequent waste 
management. Their success or failure especially depends on their technical viability, 
their economic viability, the (global) socioeconomic structures of the pulp and paper 
industry, environmental policy regulations, and situational circumstances, reflecting the 
interests and relative power of actors involved. Taking into account a time period of 
nearly 30 years (1970 - 2000) various innovative efforts are summarized in a rather 
general perspective, which embeds them in overall development trends explaining their 
success or failure over subsequent phases of technological trajectories, followed and 
does not reconstruct individual environmental innovations in detail. This approach 
allows to understand better why some environmental technologies concerning pulp 
production have been socially established and others not. 
The main purpose of the case studies is to study the influence of regulatory networks 
and framework conditions upon corresponding innovation processes, particularly the 
role of environmental policy (EP) and ecology-oriented technology policy (ETP) and 
their mutual coordination within this context (IIUW 1998). 
The study is mainly based on 17 loosely structured, sometimes multiple interviews with 
key persons involved in these regulatory and innovation processes, mostly conducted 
by telephone in March 2000 and lasting between one half and two hours. Furthermore, 
some literature, documents and research reports dealing with pulp production and 
related environmental problems, technologies and regulations have been studied. 
Finally, the draft report of the case study has been circulated to the interviewees for 
critical reading and comments, which have been taken into account according to my 
personal assessment, provided that I received them. 
The interviews were made with (former) representatives of the following institutions: 
BMU (1), UBA (2), BGA (1), DLR (1), PTWT (1), Greenpeace (1), and managers and 
scientific experts in charge of pulp-re ated R&D projects (10). Some further 
knowledgeable persons did not want to be interviewed for various reasons or could not 
be addressed any more. 
The details of regulatory networks and innovation processes were successively 
recognised and understood during the various subseq ent interviews, mainly 
conducted from February through April 2000, so that critical questions about 
controversial issues and less openly presented intangibles could be posed on a better 
knowledge basis particularly in the later interviews. 
                                         
1 They have been funded by the EU Commission as part of the ENVINNO-project (IIUW 1998). 
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From a methodological point of view, the demand to perform one (in-depth) case study 
within one-month workload necessarily implies limited validity of its results for several 
reasons. 
1. It allows hardly any (systematic scientific) verification procedures beyond 
confronting individual interviewees with diverging opinions of other persons 
interviewed and beyond asking the interviewees for corrections of and critical 
comments on the draft report. 
2. Analysis of relevant contextual literature on pulp and paper production and related 
industries, on environmental impacts of pulp production, on corporate strategies, 
and on the regulatory contexts was not possible, either.
3. Reliance on the remembrance of case histories by only few still available persons 
engaged in projects 20 or more y ars ago, without many documents recorded, 
implies further validation problems. 
4. Two of the environmental R&D projects, presented in more detail, are only 
summarized from corresponding project reports and not based on personal 
interviews, allowing even less reliable reconstruction of the social processes 
involved in conducting the project. 
5. In case of opposing opinions on the technical (or economic) viability of a newly 
developed (environmental) technology, it is hard to judge the validity of 
corresponding statements concerning R&D projects of a more distant past; so some 
risky evaluative assessments had to be made. 
6. The whole setting of partly overlapping stories of environmental innovations and 
regulations is too complex to allow a detailed analysis and description of specific 
innovation processes and of informal agreements and arrangements behind the 
scenes. Thus, a scientific assessment of the validity of the case histories and of 
their interpretation in social, political and ecological terms presented her was not 
possible either. 
7. The presentation of the case studies on about 70 pages does not allow to 
eventually discussing subtleties and different possible interpretations of the 
innovation processes reconstructed. 
Although in fact experimenting with different environmental technologies, the cases 
presented in more detail are primarily organised around three pulp mills and not around 
three specific environmental innovations in order to more clearly delineate the social 
networks underlying corresponding innovative efforts. 
The general set-up of this report is the following: first, the physical and social setting of 
pulp production is sketched in section 2 concerning basic engineering features, 
environmental impacts, environmental technologies developed, socioecon mic 
structure and environmental regulations. Second, the specific case histories of 
innovative efforts investigated are described in section 3 in some more detail and 
embedded in a survey of other environmental technologies developed in parallel. Third, 
the essential determinants characterizing the overall process of the development and 
diffusion of environmental innovations in pulp production are discussed in section 4, 
such as problem perception, environmental regulation, R&D projects, policy action, 
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(global) market conditions and competitive advantage. Finally, sections 5 to 7 
summarize the findings of the case studies referring to actor constellations, innovation 
processes, contextual interpretation, and conclusions to be drawn. 
2 The physical and social setting of pulp production 
This section gives a short introductory survey over the main physical and social 
features of pulp production with special reference to its environmental aspects. 
2.1 Characteristics and development of pulp production 
Pulp as the raw material of paper production2 is gained by chemical or mechanical 
treatment of wood.3 To do so, after debarking, chipping and screening wood to chips 
one has to separate its three components cellulose, hemicelluloses, and lignin by 
chemicals into two main parts: cellulose (and hemicelluloses) for pulp, and lignin. 
Cooking is the main delignification process in order to dissolve the lignin and to free 
the fibre by subsequent washing and screening.4 The lignin and many other organic 
substances are thus put into solution from which the chemicals and the energy content 
of the lignin and other organics may be recovered. The cellulose fibre extracted has to 
be bleached afterwards mainly for removing the remaining lignin and for improving pulp 
brightness.5 Subsequently, the pulp has to be washed and screened again, and finally 
dried. Both the extraction and the bleaching process typically consist of a sequence of 
several, i.e. 2 to 7 (or even 10) subsequent stages. Finally, the waste products 
resulting from thes processes have to be managed, frequently by using chemicals and 
energy recovery systems,6 in accordance with existing environmental regulations, 
particularly those concerning wastewater release. 
Concerning the pulping process, three types of chemical pulping processes have been 
developed in the 19th century, namely the sulfate or kraft process, the sulfite process, 
                                         
2 Apart from dissolving pulp, pulp is essentially (ca. 98% worldwide, 96% in Germany) used for all kinds 
of paper production, i.e. printing and writing paper (49%), packaging materials (38%, card and 
pasteboard), paper and pasteboard for technical and specific urposes (7%, e.g. decorating paper, 
filtering paper, photo raw paper, cigarette paper), fluff pulp and hygiene paper (6%, e.g. toilette paper, 
towel paper, cosmetic paper, tissue paper); dissolving pulp serves as raw material for producing 
viscose products, acetate products, cellulose ether, and cellulose nitrates (VDP 1999). 
3 Wood is the main raw material but (sugar cane) bagasse and linters are used, too, whereas straw, 
hemp, grass, and other cellulose-bearing material are marginal. 
4 "In mechanical pulping processes mechanical shear forces are used to pull the fibres apart and the 
majority of the lignin remains with the fibres although there is still dissolution of some organics." 
(European Commission 2000:10) 
5 For dissolving pulp, mainly produced for chemical purposes, the main task is the separation of 
hemicelluloses, whereas the separation of lignin needs not to be achieved entirely. 
6 "The cooking chemical recovery includes evaporation of the spent liquor to concentrated liquor, com-
bustion of the concentrated liquor and preparation of new cooking acid from recovered chemicals... 
Besides the recovery of cooking chemicals the recovery boiler(s) produce steam. Often sulphite pulp 
mills operate auxiliary boilers burning bark, oil or other fuels. In the e boilers, knots, rejects and 
sludge from the effluent purification may also be burned. The steam from the boilers is led to counter-
pressure turbines where electrical power is produced." (European Commission 2000:127-128) 
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and the soda (as well as some other pulping) processes, which are currently 
responsible for about 80%, 6%, and 14% of worldwide pulp production, respectively 
(Jaakko Pöyry 1997).7 
The primarily alkaline kraft process, which results from its active cooking chemicals 
sodium hydroxide (NaOH) and sodium sulfide (Na2S), at least since the 1960s has 
been "the dominating chemical pulping process worldwide because of the superior pulp 
strength properties compared with sulphite process, its application to all wood species, 
as well as to the efficient chemical recovery systems which have been developed and 
implemented. But the chemistry of the Kraft process carries with it an inherent potential 
problem of malodorous compounds." (European Commission 2000:17) Kraft pulp, 
however, requires intense bleaching processes because the lignin residue is heavily 
condensed and difficult to remove. 
"The production of sulphite pulps is much smaller than the production of kraft pulps and 
sulphite pulps are more used for special purposes in papermaking rather than being an 
alternative market pulp grade for kraft pulps." (European Commission 2000:123) The 
usually acid sulfite process can only be applied to few species of wood (beech, spruce 
in Germany), usually results in lower strength properties of the pulp, but needs less 
bleaching and offers much more flexibility (by changing the dosage and composition of 
the chemicals) than the kraft process. 
In the FRG, predominantly the sulfite process was applied after the second world war 
because there existed - after 1958 and till 1999 - no more pulp mills using the kraft 
process, and new ones required comparatively high investment costs and would have 
met severe licensing problems because of their strong odour due to sulphur emissions 
and their enormous environmental pollution at that time. 
The alkaline soda process is applied essentially for annual plants only, such as 
bagasse, linters, straw, and reed, mainly in Asia, Africa and South America. 
Bleaching was mainly done by chlorine, primarily elementary chlorine (C), but also 
hypo-chlorite (H) and chlorine dioxide (D), and by alkaline extraction bleaching using 
sodium hydroxide (E). The use of oxygen based bleaching agents reduces or avoids 
chlorine emissions. Peroxide bleaching of ground wood was patented in Germany in 
1905 already, and first used in 1940/41 (cf. Ehrhard/Alber 1998). 
Although the black liquor resulting from cooking processes was collected in kraft pulp 
mills using boilers and a lime kiln rather from the very beginning and, since 1939, in 
sulfite pulp mills, too, discharge of wastes into wastewater and subsequently surface 
waters was rather common in the pulp and paper industry which contributed strongly to 
environmental pollution, at least till to the 1980s.8 
In Germany production of chemical pulp had risen from 100.000 tons per year in 1890 
to 1,5 million tons per year in 1939, and stagnated at around 800.000 tons per year in 
                                         
7 Mechanical pulping and chemi- echanical pulping are not included in these figures. 
8 For each ton of pulp produced more than an equivalent amount of organic material was dissolved and 
discharged into the rivers. 
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the Federal Republic of Germany since 1960, with a short increase to more than 1 
million tons per year after German reunification in 1990 and again in 2000/01. World-
wide, pulp production grew from around 100 million tons per year in the early 1980s to 
around 140 million tons per year in the late 1990s. Furthermore, production of me-
chanically gained wood pulp grew in the FRG from about 700.000 tons per year in 1960 
to over 1,6 million tons per year in 1990 and declined to 1,2 million tons per year in 
1998; worldwide around 35 million tons of wood pulp are produced annually at present. 
Paper consumption grew from ca. 2,5 million tons per year in the FRG in 1960 to ca. 16 
million tons per year in 1998, compared to a global figure of around 300 million tons 
per year. The difference to pulp production is covered by imported pulp (ca.25%), 
recovered waste paper (40% in 1960,60% in 1998)9 and fillers. 
2.2 Environmental impacts of pulp production 
Pulp mills tend to pollute the environment by their wastewater, missions into the air, 
wastes, noise and smell, to use enormous amounts of water and to need quite some 
energy. Modern, environmentally relatively friendly pulp mills have considerably 
reduced these environmental burdens by means of a number of environmental 
measures for improved emission control, internal as well as external ones, so that the 
emissions have typically been reduced by 80% to 90% or more on a specific basis 
since about 1980. This has been achieved for example by wastewater purification up to 
production-integrated advanced wastewater treatment systems reusing treated process 
waters, by recovering chemicals applied, by generating self energy supply via burning 
wastes from pulp and paper manufacturing processes (rejects, sludge, and black liquor, 
in particular) thereby avoiding a waste disposal problem, or by rather closing water and 
processing cycles. "There is a development to close up water circuits in pulp and paper 
mills and a further reduction of discharges can be expected (towards effluent free 
mills). However, today there are no kraft mills operating full time, which completely 
recover all bleach plant effluent." (European Commission 2000:9) In addition, the 
growing share of recovered paper in paper production contributes to a lower demand 
for primary pulp. 
The environmental impacts of pulp production mainly result from the chemicals used for 
both cooking and bleaching, such as sulphur, chlorine, chlorinated compounds, re-
maining organic and inorganic materials, lignin and undissolved fibre material, typically 
mixed up in the black liquor, and eventually Na and Mg salts, chelating agents and 
heavy metals such as manganese or iron. Thus, the major environmental problems of 
pulp production were wastewater loads, water consumption, and gaseous emissions, 
including malodorous sulphur compounds from kraft pulping.10 
                                         
9 Worldwide waste paper recycling still amounts to only 43% (VDP 1999). 
10 "From the end of the 1970s until recently, the main emphasis was put on the role of chlorinated 
substances formed in the bleach plant. Dioxins and Furans had been detected in some effluents of 
pulp mills and the public discussion focussed on the harmful effects of chlorine bleaching. The public 
concern about the potential environmental hazard imposed by the use of chlorine in the bleach plants 
has brought about a drastic decrease in the use of molecular chlorine as a bleaching chemical during 
6 
The specific pattern of environmental impacts varies according to the local environs, to 
the production arrangement of, the technologies used in, and the environmental pro-
tection measures applied in a pulp mill, and therefore needs no further elaboration in 
this study. 
In any case, pulp production belonged to those industries involving comparatively 
severe environmental pollution till to the 1980s. 
2.3 Environmental technologies reducing environmental pollution 
Particularly in Germany, from the 1970s to the 1990s considerable efforts were made to 
reduce environmental pollution of pulp production by wastewater treatment, by 
substituting (elemental) chlorine and hypo-chlorite in bleaching processes, by 
developing new, environmentally more sound pulping technologies, and by rather 
closed cycle (integrated) processing arrangements. Frequently, mutual interference of 
these differing efforts at the level of their chemical and physical impacts as well as 
additional requirements upon subsequent processes in a mill demanded a relatively 
comprehensive approach to harmonize many processing arrangements for successful 
application of environmental technologies. 
Leaving aside efforts to reduce water consumption and basic measures to minimise 
atmospheric emissions, noise and smell, the main R&D projects, partly dealt with in this 
study, looked for various solutions to the following, primarily wastewater-related 
environmental problems. 
1. Frequently in combination with efforts to optimise bleaching processes, including at 
least partial collection and utilization of bleach plant liquor, end-of-pipe 
technologies were the first type of environmental protection measures, mainly 
undertaken during the 1960s and 1970s and often induced by concern about the 
pollution of local rivers. They were directed towards wastewater treatment by 
(multistep) biological sewage treatment plants, which considerably decreased COD 
values from for example 20.000 mg/l to less than 1.000 mg/l.11 Significantly, modern 
(biological) wastewater treatment was introduced in Germany from 1973 to 1977 at 
the Blankenstein sulfite pulp mill in the former GDR first (Geisenheiner 1982), with 
the help of Swiss and Austrian know-how, when the West German pulp industry still 
publicly declared the impracticability of such end-of-pipe technologies. However, 
biological purification processes do not tackle (chlorinated) ligneous effluents, the 
main polluting substances from pulp mills, aside from other chlorinated compounds 
in bleach plant effluents. Diverse attempts were made to purify effluents, for 
instance by adsorbing lignin with the help of appropriate compounds such as Al2O3 
                                                                                                                              
the last decade. The environmental control authorities in many countries have set severe restrictions 
on the discharges of chlorinated organics measured as AOX into the aquatic environment." (European 
Commission 2000:9) 
11 Without collection and separate treatment (buring) of bleaching liquor effective treatment of pulp mill 
wastewater effluents would have been extremely costly. Therefore (German) pulp mills typically 
installed corresponding wastewater treatment technologies only if their bleaching water filtrate could
be handled accordingly. 
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in solid bed reactors and the thermal recovery of the loaded, exhausted absorbent 
in a rotary tubular kiln. 
2. In the 1970s and 1980s different bleaching agents were tested at a laboratory level 
as well as on a large scale to substitute elementary chlorine, at first, and then 
chlorine compounds, altogether, in order to significantly reduce or eliminate AOX in 
(waste) water. Essentially four options were realised: oxygen, peroxide, ozone and 
peracetic acid. For sulfite processes peroxide bleaching (P), partly following extrac-
tion bleaching using NaOH (EP), possibly combined with oxygen as a reinforcing 
agent (EOP), has completely substituted chlorine bleaching and also reduced the 
number of bleaching stages needed in Germany since the 1990s. For modified kraft 
processes the other options, oxygen (O) or ozone (Z) bleaching stages - mor  than 
peroxide bleaching (P) - have been introduced in addition to chlorine dioxide 
bleaching (D)12 and alkaline extraction bleaching (E) stages, allowing ECF 
bleaching, whereas TCF bleaching on the basis of peroxide and ozone bleaching 
stages (P, EOP, Z), supplemented by an acid bleaching stage where a chelating 
agent, either EDTA or DTPA, has been used for removal of metals (Q), meanwhile 
is established technology, too, but still is not widely applied in kraft pulp mills yet. 
3. Since the 1970s various alternative pulping processes13 have been developed and 
successfully tested at least in pilot plants in order to reduce environmental pollution 
by low water consumption, TCF bleaching, sulphur-free technology, a simpler 
cooking process and by far-reaching closed up recovery of cooking chemicals and 
to better use the raw material wood. These are in particular the ASAM process, the 
Organocell process, the Formacell process and the Milox process (cf. Jaakko Pöyry 
1997). However, only the modified kraft process mainly developed in Scandinavian 
countries which - on the basis of application of extended (displacement) cooking 
processes, oxygen delignification, ECF (or even TCF) bleaching, rather complete 
chemicals recovery, nearly closed water cycles and of energy autarky of production 
- also drastically reduced environmental pollution of conventional kraft mills has 
been established in industrial pulp mills, meanwhile responsible for around 20% of 
worldwide pulp production. For reasons described in later sections, currently the 
other processes have no realistic chance to be introduced on a large scale except 
perhaps the ASAM process. 
4. Together with efforts towards new or modified chemical processes of environmen-
tally friendly cooking, delignification and bleaching a lot of developm nt and testing 
endeavours were made to close to a large degree water cycles and pulp processing 
cycles by recycling chemicals, energy and water. Corresponding recycling arrange-
ments and associated recovery systems depend on the specific conditions of the 
                                         
12 Only for high quality products requiring extreme brightness chlorine dioxide is still needed in the 
bleaching process. Concerning brightness of paper, it is important to note the trade-off that stronger 
bleaching efforts lead to a decrease in fibre quality in TCF processes. However, in contrast high 
brightness is achieved with chlorine dioxide without any negative impact on fibre quality. Compared to 
C-bleaching, D-bleaching results in much lower AOX. The plain substitution of Cl by ClO2 results in 
only 20% of the former AOX value. 
13 The term 'alternative pulping process' essentially refers to significant changes of cooking processes 
only, whereas the other components of the overall pulping process need not necessarily to be 
changed as well. 
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pulping processes chosen. The basic problem to be solved in such recycling proc-
esses is the control and separation of necessarily accumulating residues in order to 
avoid disturbances of genuine pulping processes or destructive effects upon the 
equipment, which may easily lead to rather complicated combinations of processing 
technologies. 
5. Finally, the transformation of waste products such as lignin into marketable by-
products reduces wastes generated and may increase profitability of pulp produc-
tion. Coresponding efforts in this direction were particularly made during the 
development of the Organocell process, but hardly resulted in economically viable 
results. In the conventional calcium sulfite process, however, there was and is a 
market for the main by-product sulfonated lignin. This polymeric compound is used 
as an additive for concrete, for drilling hole cleaning in oil production etc. 
Altogether an environmentally sound and economically attractive pulping process 
should, according to Jaakko Pöyry (1997:35-36) fulfill the following requirements: 
1. suitable to use the whole raw material (wood) 
2. applicable to a broad variety of raw materials including resinous and low-grade 
wood 
3. suitable to produce high yields of well bleachable pulp with paper qualities at least 
as good as those provided by kraft pulp
4. simple chemical cooking and delignification process that can be realised in a 
closed system and is well adjustable on a continuous as well as a discontinuous 
basis 
5. (elemental) chlorine free bleaching leading to high brightness common on the 
market 
6. far-reaching closure of chemical cycles with a simple and effective chemicals 
recovery system 
7. well-balanced energy supply by heat and electricity generation with the help of 
residues and wastes of pulp production 
8. far-reaching closure of water cycles, leading to low water demand and low 
wastewater load 
9. zero emission of pollutants into the air or at least no emission above prescribed 
environmental standards 
10. (economic) utilization of by-products wherever feasible 
11. low expenditure on investment 
12. profitable business also in small production units.
The case studies describe how far some major environmental innovations succeeded in 
fulfilling these requirements. 
2.4 Pulp production and consumption in Germany 
In a medium term perspective the demand for dissolving pulp in Germany, as one of the 
world largest consumers, can be expected to stagnate for various reasons, whereas 
demand for paper grade pulp will probably grow further (Jaakko Pöyry 1997). The 
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share of waste paper may largely cover this growth14, though with the major expansion 
mainly outside Germany, whereas kraft pulp, wood pulp and fillers may more or less 
keep their shares, and the share of sulfite pulp will probably decline. Consequently, 
imported (coniferous and hardwood kraft) pulp (at present mainly from Sweden, 
Finland, Canada, and the USA) continues to play a major role. Thus, the erection of 
new pulp mills in Germany is rather unlikely.15 Meanwhile a competitive pulp mill needs 
to at least produce 200.000 or even 500.000 tons of pulp per year, and its greenfield 
erection requires more than 500 million Euro.
The trend towards integrated pulp and paper production left only around one third of 
global pulp production offered on the market (market pulp). In Germany, all pulp is 
produced in integrated pulp and paper mills; only the Blankenstein mill, which 
converted its 20-year-old sulfite operation to kraft pulping and increased its capacity by 
75% to 280.000 tons per year between 1996 and 199916, still produces market pulp. 
Integrated pulp and paper production facilitates changes towards environmentally more 
friendly processing techniques because trade-offs between them and pulp quality, for 
instance acceptability of somewhat lower brightness can be dealt with within the 
company and are not decided by external customers. 
Whereas Germany has a large share in global paper production which was dominated 
by medium-sized firms nationally in the past (cf. Kirschten 1991), that have been 
bought up mostly by large foreign, mainly Swedish corporations especially during the 
last decade, its pulp production is comparatively low, as indicated above. Together with 
the dominance of pulp imports and the integration of pulp production in paper mills, 
conflicting interests between the pulp industry and the paper industry no longer play 
any significant role in Germany. 
Overall, structure and development of the (German) pulp and paper industry are 
characterised by continuous concentration processes17 (from ca. 300 firms before 1960 
to ca. 100 firms in 1999), by repeated purchase and sale of existing mills by different 
companies,18 often connected with bankruptcies, by successive shut down of pulp mills 
                                         
14 In order to ensure the strength and other properties of the paper to be produced primary fibres usually 
have to be added to strengthen recovered waste paper, besides the use of fillers. Thus, waste paper 
will not completely substitute primary pulp. It is dominantly applied for producing lower quality paper, 
for instance newsprint. It therefore replaces mainly mechanical pulp, but not chemical pulp. In high 
quality paper typically no waste paper can be used because it is neither clean nor bright e ugh. 
15 In view of public subsidies for investments in new industrial plants in Eastern Germany, there is since 
years a still ongoing debate about building a new pulp mill at Stendal, but with declining chances to 
get realised. 
16 The necessary investments for this changeover to an environmentally tolerable kraft process were 
close to 300 million Euro, with one third coming from public subsidies. 
17 Meanwhile Haindl is the only big genuine German paper producer left with a world scale capacity of 
various grades of printing paper. Furthermore few German specialty producers still exist using linters 
for producing dissolving pulp sold to pharmaceutical and chemical industry. 
18 "In 25 years the number of paper machines in Europe has been reduced by about 60% while the total 
capacity has almost doubled. Many companies have grown by investing in new capacity but also by 
consolidating a large number of small obsolete paper and board mills. Thus, the European paper in-
dustry comprises a relatively small number of vey large multi-national groups at one end of the scale 
yet a large number of small businesses at the other. The large number of relative small sized mills 
has developed niche strategies on the market. - There has been a significant change in the ownership 
structure in the last 10 years. Typical features in this development have been concentration of produ-
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too small to rest profitable under stricter environmental regulations19, by buying up the 
few larger pulp mills left in Germany by major foreign corporations, and by strongly 
fluctuating pulp prices in correlation with available stocks of market pulp and 
temporarily demand drops (between 400 and 1.000 US$).20 
Reacting to severe problems of environmental pollution by pulp mills, to public 
environmental debate and protest, to growing demand for chlorine free pulp and paper, 
to upcoming environmental regulations, to pressure of environmental policy and to 
financial support of technology policy, German pulp produce s - after a long period of 
(declining) resistance - undertook considerable efforts from the late 1970s onwards to 
reduce environmental pollution by chlorine-free bleaching, by efficient closing of pulp 
processing cycles and by minimising wastewater contamination. Following a similar 
proclamation in 1993 pulp and paper producers and publishers committed themselves 
to do their best of ecological care in forestry, pulp and paper production, paper 
recycling and printing in a voluntary declaration in 1996 and 1997 (at least if 
economically viable), though rendered more difficult by ongoing rationalization efforts 
in pulp mills leaving less manpower for environmental management tasks. Furthermore, 
pulp mills gradually practise environmental auditing according t  EMAS or at least ISO 
14000. By international comparison, environmental standards as well as practices in 
Germany clearly are among the most advanced ones at present. For instance, 80% of 
all TCF pulp produced worldwide is used in Germany. 
2.5 Environmental regulation of pulp production 
Although German pulp mills licensed after 1939 were already confronted with quite 
some emission restrictions, general environmental regulation of pulp production mainly 
developed over the past 30 years, in parallel with the evolution of environmental re-
gulation in general. As an industry contributing significantly to environmental pollution 
the pulp and paper industry was given special attention by environmental policy. 
The key regulations in this respect are the AbwAG passed in 1976, the AbwasserVwV 
annex 19 referring to §7a WHG, and the various ordinances of the BImSchG. The first 
one imposes levies on wastewater emissions that vary according to the volumes of 
specified hazardous substances emitted. The second one sets limit values for key 
parameters (particularly COD, AOX) in wastewater and formulates general require-
ments for ecologically sound pulp processing.21 The environmental standards required 
by the AbwasserVWV annex 19, first enacted in 1982, have been strengthened and 
                                                                                                                              
cers into bigger companies and integration of paper mills with the overseas pulp producers or acqui-
sitions or financial cooperation relationships between European and overseas manufacturers." 
(European Commission 2000:8) 
19 The same holds true for the closure of all but one pulp mill in the former GDR, being small and not 
modernized for several decades. 
20 "The price variation is not the same for all pulp and aper products. The closer a company is to the 
ultimate consumer, the smaller the price fluctuations of the product. For example, the price of pulp is 
much more volatile than that of tissue paper." (European Commission 2000:8) 
21 In this context appropriate measurement techniques have to be specified, possibly accompanied by 
substantial bargaining processes leading to considerable delay in passing an ordinance. 
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enlarged in its amendments in 1989 and, quite probably, in 2000.22 Authorization of a 
pulp mill or of related changes of its technical equipment and processes is dominated 
by licensing procedures according to the BImSchG, which put together approval deci-
sions concerning air pollution, waste management, water supply, wastewater treatment, 
substances jeopardizing water quality, safety of installations, occupational safety, noise 




schließt ab mit: 
– Raumordnungsgesetz - ROG- 








– Baugesetzbuch – BauGB- Bauleitplanung (Erarbeitung 
des gemeindlichen Flächen 
nutzungsplanes 
è Bebauungsplan) 
Genehmigung und  
Bekanntmachung 
– Bundes-Immissions-Schutzgesetz – BImSchG 
Mit u.a. VO zum BImSchG 
– VO über genehmigungsbedürftige Anlagen -  
4. BImSchV 
– VO über das Genehmigungsverfahren - 9. 
BImSchV 
– Emissionsschutz-VO - 11. BImSchV 
– Störfall-VO - 12. BImSchV 
– VO über Großfeuerungsanlagen - 13. BImSchV 
– VO über Verbrennungsanlagen für Abfälle u. 
ähnl. Brennbare Stoffe - 17. BImSchV 
– Technische Anleitung Luft (TA Luft) 




Genehmigung mit  
Auflagen 
– Wasserhaushaltsgesetz -WHG 
– Wassergesetze der Länder 
– Abfallgesetz –AbfG- bzw. das das AbfG ablö-










Genehmigung mit  
Auflagen 
– Wasserhaushaltsgesetz .- WHG – 
– Wassergesetze der Länder 
Wasserrechtliche Verfahren Wasserrechtliche  
Erlaubnis 
Table 1: Legal prescriptions for licensing a new pulp mill in Germany (Source: Jaakko 
Pöyry 1997:482/483) 
                                         
22 In particular, the COD limit value required has been lowered from between 80 and 350 kg/t pulp 
produced (depending on the pulp type) over 70 kg/t to 40/25 kg/t (referring to existing or new plants). 
Similarly, the AOX limit value was not denominated in the AbwasserVwV annex 19 in 1982, fixed at 1 
kg/t in 1989 and lowered to 0,35/0,25 kg/t for existing and new plants, respectively, in 2000 in the 
corresponding annex 19 amendments. These are quite strict limit values by international comparison.
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Meanwhile the erection or significant modification of a new or existing pulp mill, 
respectively, have to undergo a relatively complex licensing process according to 
various regulations23, indicated in table 1, that lasts at least one year.24 
3 Case histories 
With increasing environmental concern and upcoming environmental regulation during 
the 1970s environmental policy forced and ecology- riented technology policy 
supported R&D projects of the pulp industry and corresponding academic research 
institutes aiming at the reduction of environmental pollution. Although similar efforts 
could be observed in other (Western) countries, especially Sweden and later on 
Austria, as well, Germany has been a frontrunner undertaking manifold innovative 
endeavours in this respect. 
In accordance with the focus of the ENVINNO project, at three locations two projects of 
environmental technology development respectively have been investigated in 
somewhat more detail. They are described and contextualized in the following sections. 
These environmental innovations are examples of different approaches and foci to deal 
with primarily wastewater-r lated environmental problems of pulp production by 
appropriate technologies, namely wastewater purification by aluminium oxide or by 
combined aerobic and anaerobic biological treatment, substitution of molecular chlorine 
bleaching by peroxide bleaching or by high pressure oxygen bleaching, and alternative 
pulping technologies, i.e. the ASAM process and the Organocell process. Two of these 
six R&D projects, namely two-step biological wastewater treatment at Ehingen and 
oxygen bleaching at Kelheim, are summarized solely on the basis of the final project 
reports and not of extended interviews with key persons involved in these projects. 
3.1 Ehingen 
The efforts of the pulp mill of Schwäbische Zellstoff AG inEhingen to reduce its 
environmental pollution can be characterized by two main steps: successful tests and 
use of hydrogen peroxide (H2O2) to successively introduce chlorine-fre  bleaching in 
the 1970s and early 1980s, supplemented by an oxygen bleaching stage in 1983, 
minimised AOX emissions and provided the preconditions for the subsequent building 
of a biological purification plant in the late 1980s, using for the first time both aerobic 
and anaerobic purification techniques for wastewater treatment in pulp production. 
                                         
23 These result from laws addressing areal planning, construction, ambient environmental quality, 
wastes, water regulation and protection, nature protection, and environmental impact assessment. 
24 The reconstruction of the Blankenstein pulp mill changing from the sulfite to the kraft process lasted 3 
years in all from the start of project planning onwards. 
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3.1.1 Introduction of peroxide bleaching 
The basic idea initiating the project was to reduce chlorine bleaching in order to allow 
treatment of bleach washing filtrate that was not possible as long as it contained 
chlorides leading to corrosive effects on the installations.25 However, quality of the 
market pulp produced should not suffer in order not to lose customers.26 Thus, in the 
early 1970s the concern was not AOX emission per se, but the future treatment of 
wastewater containing lignin and hemic lluloses implying high COD demand and, later, 
also it was the eventual formation of chlorinated dioxins by chlorine bleaching, as 
pointed out in the dioxin debate following the Seveso accident. Because the Ehingen 
pulp mill had no (biological) wastewater treatment plant, wastewater effluents were of 
particular importance because they affected filtration of drinking water downstream the 
Danube river and raised concern in the responsible water supply corporation Landes-
wasserversorgung Baden-Württemberg, which approached the Schwäbische Zellstoff 
AG in this respect. 
In 1971 the Schwäbische Zellstoff AG, which had an annual turnover of around 50 
million Euro at that time, began to experiment with oxygen and peroxide bleaching on a 
laboratory scale. High pressure oxygen bleaching was already used for kraft pulp. The 
experiments with sulfite pulp led to mixed results and were not continued on a larger 
scale because of considerable financial means required. For the experiments with 
comparatively expensive peroxide the main German producer of hydrogen peroxide 
Degussa27 was contacted which was well interested in opening up a potential new 
market for this product. With the technical assistance and the provision of laboratory 
facilities by Degussa the experiments showed the viability of peroxide bleaching, which 
was previously known to be feasible for mechanical pulp only.28 In 1974, P-bleaching 
was then tested at a large-scale level leading to the conclusion that elemental chlorine 
could be substituted to a large degre . 
On the basis of this knowledge application for BMFT funds appeared promising, and 
from 1975 through 1977 a subsequent R&D project systematically investigating P-
bleaching of (calcium-based) sulfite pulp on a laboratory and an operational scale was 
co-funded with 0,8 million Euro, i.e. 50%, coming from the BMFT.29 Funding of this 
project suited the interests of all parties concerned: the Schwäbische Zellstoff AG 
received significant support to continue its efforts in reducing C-bleaching for 
environmental protection purposes, Degussa had the chance to test at an operational 
level the usability of peroxide on a new market, the BMFT and the research project 
                                         
25 Burning, evaporation or recovery of wastes from cooking was well feasible because without 
hydrochloric acid originating from chlorine no significant problems of corrosion occurred. 
26 A major advantage of C-bleaching is that chlorine does not attack pulp. 
27 Faced with economic problems Degussa in 1999 merged with Hüls to the Degussa-Hüls company. A 
further merger with SKW Trostberg will take place in 2001. 
28 Furthermore, questions concerning the effects on pulp quality, i.e. viscosity, had to be answered. 
29 Furthermore, Degussa invested a considerable sum of altogether around 10 to 15 million Euro in its 
general program on testing and marketing P-bleaching in the following decade, started with the 
Schäbische Zellstoff AG, though these expenses for technology development remained below 5% of 
Degussa's turnover in this area. 
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management body responsible for promoting environmental technology development 
seized a good opportunity for ETP in that direction, EP could possibly expect evidence 
for the technical feasibility to meet certain environmental standards, and water utilities 
affected by pulp mills could envisage potential reduction of corresponding pollution of 
waters in the future. 
Within the project, described in DLR 1991, the Schwäbische Zellstoff AG cautiously 
tested and expanded P-bleaching by cooperating with Degussa at a laboratory level, by 
first applying P-bleaching for short periods only, by monitoring satisfaction of ustomers 
with the pulp quality achieved30, by gradually enlarging the share of P-bleaching, by 
investigating the limitations of P-bleaching concerning certain types of pulp and full 
substitution of chlorine in the pre-bleaching stage, by successfully testing and applying 
biological wastewater treatment and evaporation of wastes resulting from P-bleaching, 
and by ensuring that the water authority Tübingen31 approved this configuration 
applying new methods, whereas the general license stemmed from 1940.32 The aim of 
the project was not to eliminate, but only to reduce chlorine application. Similarly, ECF 
bleaching was no primary objective; not until end of 1977 it was partly applied. Apart 
from the ordinary operating personnel 1 chemist and between 2 or 3 laboratory 
technicians were continuously involved in this project, where manpower costs 
consumed much less than 50% of total project costs.
Based on an analysis of market structure, technological options and probable 
resistances of potential clients Degussa followed a strategy to demonstrate the 
advantages of applying peroxide and to respond to the specific problems of their 
customers in order to convince them to change to an expensive bleaching agent. 
Instead of trying to largely substitute chlorine by peroxide at once, Degussa was 
content with continuous widening of P-bleaching by successive optimisation of the 
whole process of bleaching and wastewater treatment based upon the mutual support 
of partial problem solutions found. For instance, the combination of P-bleaching 
experiments with modifications in the bleaching facilities allowed better and more 
intense washing that required in turn less water leading to efficiency gains and multiple 
use of water and chemicals. During and after the Ehingen project Degussa established 
contacts to all other pulp producers, too. It was the perspective of both peroxide 
supplier and user that the adoption of P-bleaching by other pulp producers was a 
necessary condition to permit price decrease for peroxide by economies of scale in 
peroxide production, which in turn made P-bleaching economically viable for the first 
time. 
                                         
30 The Schwäbische Zellstoff AG at that time primarily produced high quality market pulp with the focus 
in dissolving grade specialties. 
31 This authority was involved in all environmental R&D projects of the Schwäbische Zellstoff AG 
described by being informed about, commenting and approving proceedings and decisions of the 
company and the funding organisations BMFT and UBA. 
32 The need to add chelating agents such as EDTA or DPTA in P-bleaching stages in order to prevent 
decomposition of peroxide by heavy metals was not yet perceived as an environmental issue itself 
around 1980 (cf. Conrad 2000b). It has to be noted that at that time no chelating agent was added. 
The washing configuration of the Ehingen pulp mill removed all detrimental heavy metals ahead of 
the bleach plant because of their solubility in the sulfite process. 
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Furthermore, after the successful completion of the R&D project described and ongoing 
experiments at the operational level the development of a high shear mixer in Sweden 
in 1982, that enormously facilitated the effective application of O-bleaching in domains 
of medium consistency33, offered the chance to combine oxygen and peroxide in a 
bleaching plant allowing to oxidise lignin and to bleach in parallel. Such a combined 
bleaching facility reduced the demand for peroxide and thus the price of bleaching as 
well as the need for C-bleaching because together, oxygen and peroxide could fulfill 
most pulp quality requirements. However, the need to incorporate a high shear mixer in 
the bleaching tower implied the construction of a new bleaching plant which required 
the Schäbische Zellstoff AG to invest some more half million Euro. The pulp mill at 
Ehingen was the first one to install such a combined EOP bleaching plant around 1983, 
which is now present in all (German) sulfite pulp mills. Although a second and third D-
bleaching or H-bleaching stage were still applied, already considerably reducing AOX 
contamination of wastewater by a factor 2 or 5, TCF bleaching experiments wer  
pursued at that time, too, induced by the emerging debate on AOX. Especially after the 
R&D efforts at Baienfurt to purify pulp mill effluents by end-of-pipe technologies failed 
in 1980, as described in section 3.2.1, the strategy to reduce and avoid chlorine in pulp 
bleaching received further corroboration and proved to be the superior one. In any 
case, pulp production at Ehingen had considerably reduced its COD and AOX burden 
in wastewater effluents around 1985. Altogether the successive optimisation process 
towards chlorine-free bleaching met no severe technical obstacles, was pursued and 
promoted by the responsible managing director of the Schwäbische Zellstoff AG, was 
propagated in dozens of (scientific) articles, mostly together with Degussa, led to ECF 
bleaching after 1985 though connected with the loss of some customers because not 
every pulp quality could be achieved anymore.34 Interestingly, since there was no 
patent acquired in the P-bleaching process because of the public funding involved, 
some patent-related disputes occurred in the USA several years later, when similar P-
bleaching processes were developed there, too, without referring to the R&D results 
achieved at Ehingen. 
In 1987 the Schwäbische Zellstoff AG was taken over by Hannover Papier Alfeld, which 
had been bought itself by the Swedish pulp producer NCB in 1970s.35 In this context 
the pulp mill was complemented by a paper machine, operating since 1993, in order to 
change to integrated production facilities for economic reasons and to no longer 
produce primarily dissolving grade market pulp. The sales of pulp were shifted to paper 
grade qualities. With the complete change to TCF bleaching in 1991 this switch in pulp 
production strategy together with the advantage of being the first to offe  chlorine-free 
paper increasingly demanded on the market strongly contributed to the survival of the 
plant at Ehingen on the market. 
                                         
33 Before that time oxygen delignification was a complicated, expensive process because it required 
high consistency dewatering and a special reactor design and equipment. 
34 Meanwhile, these special dissolving pulps are produced predominantly from linters containing no 
lignin, which is done by specialty pulp producers. 
35 Being in economic troubles NCB sold both factories to the South African pulp and producer Sappi in 
1992. 
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To sum up, the widening use of chlorine-fre  bleaching primarily originated in 
Germany, where 80% of all TCF pulp produce  worldwide is sold today. Substitution 
started with peroxide bleaching in the 1970s, where several factors worked together: 
problem pressure generated by the lacking treatment of wastewater polluting 
downstream waters used for extracting drinking water prepa ation by the water utility, 
engagement of the responsible managing director of the Schwäbische Zellstoff AG in 
favour of environmental improvements, unfeasibility of purifying wastewater of 
chlorinated compounds, interest of a major peroxide producer in n w markets, 
considerable EP pressure on the pulp and paper industry, financial support for 
developing peroxide bleaching by ETP, and for extensive wastewater treatment by EP. 
The combination of oxygen and peroxide bleaching in a newly developed high shear 
mixer, and the further development of EOP bleaching in the Alfeld pulp mill during the 
1980s in principle permitted complete substitution of chlorine in bleaching sulfite pulp in 
the early 1980s. Intensified environme tal regulations on wastes from pulp and paper 
production limiting AOX emissions, when finally enacted in 1990, led to rapid 
introduction of TCF bleaching in Germany. Furthermore, corresponding environmental 
debate and policy contributed to the development towards an overall environmentally 
more friendly attitude of the German pulp and paper industry and induced ongoing 
diffusion of at least ECF bleaching in most (Western) countries. 
3.1.2 Two-step biological wastewater treatment 
The success in substituting chlorine bleaching largely by combined peroxide and 
oxygen bleaching (EOP) provided both the chemical preconditions and the 
psychological basis to invest in an ambitious project of a combined aerobic and 
anaerobic biological wastewater treatment plant together with a pyrolysis plant in 1984 
to 1990/91 which required nearly 20 million Euro investment costs, excluding the 
pyrolysis plant, and received public funds of about 8,5 million Euro by the UBA.  
Furthermore, a flue gas desulphurisation plant was incorporated in the existing boiler 
plant in a parallel project lasting from 1981 to 1988, which led to only mixed results and 
was finally stopped in 1988. It required investment costs of 11,5 million Euro and was 
co-funded from 1981 to 1986 with ca. 5 million Euro by UBA, too, but is not presented 
here in detail. UBA had the opportunity to partly fund demonstration projects 
concerning reduction of air pollution and convinced the BMI to use the corresponding 
budget title to reduce water pollution, too. Such demonstration projects allowed EP to 
influence technology development beyond end-of-pipe technologies and to show an at 
that time reluctant pulp and paper industry the technical feasibility of effective 
wastewater treatment. In the context of ongoing bargaining processes on the 
amendment of the AbwasserVwV annex 19 adding a rather strict AOX limit value UBA 
was therefore ready to contribute up to 50% of total project costs.36 At that time UBA 
                                         
36 For Degussa (and other peroxide suppliers) such an AOX standard was advantageous because it 
worked in favour of introducing P-bleaching. 
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co-funded a project of EOP bleaching at the operational level at the pulp mill Alfeld with 
1,25 million Euro, too, which is shortly described in section 3.4. 
Concerning the project of biological wastewater purification, during its first phase (ca. 
1984-87) the pyrolysis plant which should evaporate and combust the EOP bleaching 
liquor and produce pyrolysis coke for adsorption purposes was built and laboratory and 
pilot plant experiments varying biological purification set-ups were carried out. During 
the second project phase (ca. 1988- 1) the biological wastewater treatment plant was 
built and optimised, which was planned to utilize pyrolysis coke. 
After several years of experiments the demonstration project was successful 
concerning combined aerobic and anaerobic wastewater treatment regularly applied 
since 1989, which reduced ligneous compounds in wastewater dras ically as indicated 
by reduction of COD values of more than 70% after anaerobic treatment, of over 50% 
after aerobic treatment, and together of 80%. The demonstration project failed, 
however, to install a viable pyrolysis process for distilled bleaching liquor and 
producing coke because of the expensive price and technical defaults of the pyrolysis 
plant delivered by a foreign producer.37 Having guaranteed its performance he after 
long disputes disassembled and took back the pyrolysis plant, which was started in 
1987 and shut down in 1990. 
Following the results of several years of laboratory and pilot plant experiments and 
external expert opinion the two-step biological wastewater treatment plant was installed 
in 1989 using 3 methane reactors built for anaerobic treatment of different wastewater 
streams by a sludge contact process and 4 (closed) tanks built for aerobic treatment by 
an activated sludge treatment. Whereas the anaerobic purification stage worked quite 
well from the beginning, the aerobic purification stage needed further improvements. To 
compensate for the failure of the pyrolysis plant the methane reactors were coated with 
adsorptive carrier material developed in cooperation with Bayer, a large German 
chemical corporation, and the newly constructed boiler to wash and burn sulfite liquor 
was modified to include (EOP) bleaching liquor. Furthermore, besides other 
environmental improvements in pulp processing the pre-bleaching sequence C/D-EOP 
was reversed into EOP-C/D reducing generation of AOX considerably. 
Thus, the two-step biological wastewater treatment plant, needing 10 persons of 
technical personnel for its operation, proved to fulfill initial expectations well from 1990 
on by reducing COD values of wastewater to about one quarter and AOX values to one 
third and to less than 1% after complete change to TCF bleaching, as confirmed by 
expert opinion (Jedele/Schilling 1991) commissioned by the regional government of 
Tübingen. 
                                         




The R&D efforts towards environmentally sound pulp production at Baienfurt, situated 
at a small river falling into lake Konstanz, relate to two completely different 
environmental innovations, developed and tested in two different plants at two different 
periods of time. The first one concerns purification of pulping effluent of the existing 
pulp mill by aluminium oxide in 1977 to 1980, that failed for problems related to the 
thermal recovery of aluminium oxide necessary primarily for economic reasons. The 
second one concerns the development of the ASAM process as an alter ative pulping 
process, which was deployed on a laboratory scale at the institute for wood technology 
of Hamburg university and developed and tested further in a pilot plant at Baienfurt in 
the 1980s and 1990s. The ASAM process tries to combine several pulping techniques 
in such a way that their respective advantages are realised and their disadvantages are 
avoided. The development of the ASAM process proved to be successful, but it has not 
yet been implemented on an industrial scale for various reasons. 
3.2.1 Wastewater purification by aluminium oxide 
Because of the guidelines of the international water protection commission for lake 
Konstanz, introduced in 1971, the pulp and cardboard factory at Baienfurt, owned by 
the Feldmühle AG, had to purify its wastewat rs rather completely or to close the mill. A 
one-stage biological wastewater treatment plant, reducing COD concentrations to 
below 1000 mg/l, was installed around 1970 and a second stage was added in 1974, 
reducing COD values to 600 mg/l. However, the main polluting substances, AOX-lignin 
compounds contained in the bleach plant effluent were resistant to biological 
degradation. Therefore, between 1971 and 1974 diverse physico-c emical purification 
techniques were tested together with biological degradation, p rtly up to semi-technical 
plants: flocculation with lime or salts, catalytic oxidation, ultra-filtration with capillars 
and membranes, adsorption on activated carbon, electrochemical techniques, 
radioactive irradiation, and ozonisation. After all attempts failed to show satisfactory 
results, systematic experiments were made concerning lignin absorption to (granular) 
aluminium oxide in solid bed reactors, and the thermal recovery of the loaded, 
exhausted absorbent in a rotary tubular kiln. First, laboratory and large-scale 
experiments were performed in collaboration with the DVGW research unit at the 
university of Karlsruhe (cf. McLachlan 1977, Fischer 1978), partly funded by the state 
government of Baden-Württemberg. Then a large plant was installed with four solid bed 
reactors and a recovery kiln (Förster/Solbach 1979). This project was co-funded (50%) 
by the BMFT under the auspices of PTWT. Total project costs amounted to about 5,5 
million Euro, and additional manpower of one full-time equivalent was engaged in the 
project for two years. The intended environmental project objectives to reduce the COD 
value and to discolour the wastewater were achieved. Because aluminium oxide 
(Al2O3) was expensive and was needed in immense quantities in order to offer large 
surfaces for effective adsorption processes, it had to be regenerated for economic (and 
environmental) reasons. However, the chlorine contained in the absorbed substances, 
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converted into hydrochloric acid during combustion, led to severe corrosion of the 
materials coating the tubular kiln. In spite of experimenting with various coating 
materials and with different sizes and arrangements of granular aluminium oxide this 
problem could not be solved, and after 3 to 4 months the recovery kiln was more or less 
ruined. Thus, ultimately the solid bed reactors served sedimentation purposes for the 
pulp wastewater, whereas the original goal of the project to purify bleach plant effluent 
in a technically and economically viable manner had failed and consequently was not 
pursued further.38 
3.2.2 Development of the ASAM process 
The initial formation and development of the new pulping process ASAM is connected 
with its main inventor, professor Patt at Hamburg university, who was already involved 
in developing ozone bleaching, mentioned above, with the interest of EP, TP and 
certain companies in an ecologically sound pulp production, and with the interest of the 
German pulp industry in keeping its raw material basis by a production process 
meeting increasingly strict environme tal regulations. 
The basic underlying objective was the development of a complete pulp production 
plant fulfilling in particular the following requirements: 
1. It is able to process all wood species what is unfeasible for the sulfite process 
prevailing in Germany. 
2. It produces pulp qualities superior to the sulfite process and at least equal to the 
kraft process. 
3. It is environmentally friendly because of TCF bleaching, chemicals recovery, and 
offering the chance to close the water loop, which can already be chieved by 
modifications of existing conventional pulping techniques. 
4. It is economically competitive. 
Basically the ASAM process is an alkaline sulfite process supported by methanol as an 
organic solvent and anthraquinone as a redox catalyst (for a summarizing description 
see cf. DLR 1990, Jaakko Pöyry 1997, Schubert et al. 1993, 1994, Teder/Sjöström 
1994). On principle, the equipment of an ASAM pulp mill differs from that of a kraft pulp 
mill only by its facilities to recover methanol and to convert chemicals after black liquor 
combustion. Its advantages over the dominant kraft process are the following ones 
(Jaakko Pöyry 1997:113): somewhat higher pulp yields (<3%) implying less wood input, 
equal or even greater pulp strength, favourable bleachability of ASAM pulp allowing 
TCF bleaching without any problems, less bleaching stages facilitating closure of 
processing cycles, separation of sodium and sulphur components in the recovery 
process allowing the application of sulphur-free soda lye in the bleaching process, 
significant reduction of bad smell by prevention of hydrogen sulfide (H2S) emission. 
These advantages of the ASAM process have been developed and demonstrated by 
                                         
38 In hindsight, this was a fortunate decision. Even if the corrosion problem eventually could have been 
solved with very expensive construction material, the regeneration temperature for aluminium oxide 
is at a level that generates the highest amounts of chlorinated dioxins, as is known today. 
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R&D efforts lasting around a decade from 1985 to 1994. Its disadvantages result 
primarily from the complicated multi-step recovery process of chemicals implying 
additional investment costs. Furthermore, the cooking process requires high pressure 
(11-14 bar), and water recycling cannot be realised completely because water flows 
containing heavy metals such as manganese destroy hydrogen peroxide applied in 
bleaching and therefore have to be channelled separately to the wastewater treatment 
plant. The ASAM process, unlike the kraft process and like the sulfite process, is well 
suited for dissolving pulp, which is a minor market segment, however, compared to 
paper grade pulp. 
At present, a simpler recovery process based on modern pyrolysis techniques is just 
tested in a pilot plant in the USA. This technology may allow a shorter bleaching 
sequence with a better chance of complete water recycling. These experiments being 
successful, the chance of the ASAM process to be introduced on an industrial scale will 
grow once more. Besides other reasons described below, the failure of corresponding 
efforts in the past is due to parallel considerable improvements of the dominant kraft 
process which made it environmentally more friendly than in the past, as indicated by 
the approval of the change to the modified kraft process in the Blankenstein pulp mill. 
By comparison, other alternative pulping processes such as Organocell, Formacell, or 
Milox currently have no real chance of market penetration (Jaakko Pöyry 1997). 
The history of the ASAM process can be summarized as follows. Between 1985 and 
1989 the concept was developed, discussed and tested on a laboratory scale at 
Hamburg university, largely funded by the BMFT via DLR with 440.000 Euro. From 
1989 through 1994 the ASAM process was studied in a pilot plant at Baienfurt 
consisting of a cooking and chlorine fr e bleaching departments and methanol 
recovery facilities. This project was funded mainly by Kraftanlagen Heidelberg, a 
subsidiary of Agiv, with 9,5 million Euro, and by public grants of about 3,8 million Euro, 
with 3,3 million Euro provided by the BMFT via DLR again. From 1994 through 1996 
some further variations of the ASAM process were studied, and in 1999 the pilot plant 
was shut down, incidentally in parallel with the closure of the small Baienfurt pulp mill. 
Finally, having demonstrated its technical v ability and even partial superiority several 
attempts have been made since 1994 to introduce the ASAM process on an industrial 
scale by attracting interest of major investors in market introduction of this new pulping 
technology, which all failed, however, for reasons indicated below. 
When the favourable results of the R&D project developing the ASAM process at the 
university of Hamburg were disseminated among and positively perceived by interested 
actors, plans to build a pilot plant with a capacity of 5 tons per day at Baienfurt to 
develop the ASAM process further to the point of series production assumed definite 
form. The Feldmühle AG owning the Baienfurt pulp and cardboard factory showed 
interest in the new pulping process, and therefore was ready to rent out old buildings 
for installing the pilot plant and to provide the necessary infrastructure such as water 
supply, electricity and steam. Kraftanlagen Heidelberg was willing to construct the pilot 
plant hoping to benefit from this development process by future construction and sale 
of large-scale pulp mills, and selected someone who had just finished his dissertation 
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on the ASAM process at the institute for wood technology, Hamburg university, to 
manage the pilot plant. The scientists of this university inst tute had a genuine interest 
in seeing their concept further developed towards market introduction. The BMFT 
granted the considerable amount of 3.3 million Euro in order to provide sufficient 
incentive to develop the ASAM process to the point of series production from 1988 
through 199139, whereas DLR was in charge of supervising project development.40 
Some additional funding came from the EU Commission for a joint R&D project with 
Italian researchers addressing the use of low-grade wood qualities. The BMU as well 
as the department of environment of the state Baden-Württemberg were informed of 
the project that was likely provide technological capability to further reduce wastewater 
contamination by pulp mills. 
The pilot plant was established in 1989 and managed independently from the 
neighbouring pulp and cardboard factory. The subsequent systematic investigations 
and development processes showed the successful results, partly listed above. The 
major problems to be solved in the early 1990s were the appropriate separation of a 
water flow containing heavy metals from the water flow conducted in a closed cycle, 
mentioned above, and the trouble-fre  integration of the TCF bleach plant, developed 
by the company Austrian Energy & Environment, in the ASAM process, wh re the main 
task consisted in bringing together many individual steps into a harmonious overall 
process.41 Finally, some concern arose from the use of the chelating agent EDTA 
needed in P-bleaching, because the alternative option of acid extraction interrupts the 
alkaline water cycle and thus made closure of the water cycle more complex. Altogether 
around 25 people were continuously involved in the project, with around 17 being 
engaged in actual plant operation, 3 to 5 doing related research at Hamburguniversity, 
and 3 from Kraftanlagen Heidelberg dealing with planning, sales and marketing. 
After the industrial feasibility of the ASAM processing technology had been 
demonstrated in 1993 the continued operation or - without corresponding personnel 
after 1996 - at least the availability of the pilot plant provided the reference needed in 
the attempts of building a corresponding pulp mill on an industrial scale producing at 
least 200.000 tons of pulp per year, although this required further expenditures of ca. 
1,5 million Euro. In 1999 there was no reason anymore to keep the pilot plant ready for 
further experiments with the ASAM process. At the same time, the Swedish pulp 
producer Stora, which had bought up the pulp and paper plants of the Feldmühle AG in 
1991, shut down the pulp mill at Baienfurt because its relatively small size made it not 
profitable any longer. 
                                         
39 The duration of the project was subsequently extended till 1993. 
40 In addition, in 1989 the BMFT provided further funds of 270.000 Euro to the institute for wood 
technology to produce pulp from annual plants via the ASAM process in an R&D project, ultimately 
lasting 4 years. 
41 Chemicals recovery, successfully tested by Austrian Energy & Environment in a small pilot plant at 
Graz, adding a liquor burning boiler, a conversion system including a causticization installation, and 
lime recovery to the existing evaporation facility with methanol recovery, failed because real loop 
closure could not be achieved. 
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Whereas the overall development of the ASAM process led to favourable technological 
results, that was not the case on the investment side. Various corporations were 
approached by the managers of the pilot plant and by the owners of the Asam 
Technologie GmbH newly funded in 1994 because these corporations were interested 
in and capable of building a first pulp mill on an industrial scale based on the ASAM 
process. However, either they were not willing to take the financial risk of introducing a 
new pulping technology on the highly competitive pulp market or they suffered huge 
losses elsewhere in their business. Thus, the diffusion story of a rather far-reaching 
environmental innovation up till now exhibits a pattern of repeated withdrawals of 
diverse companies seriously considering market introduction of the ASAM process. 
1. The Feldmühle AG considered in 1990 to build a new pulp mill at Wittenberge in 
the former GDR, possibly utilizing the ASAM process. Since Stora in 1991, 
however, which owned primarily pulp mills based on the kraft process, bought up 
the company this option was not pursued further. 
2. Around 1992/93 the option to convert an existing pulp mill in Canada based on 
sodium sulfite and owned by Stora, which suited well the purpose to change to the 
ASAM process, was seriously envisaged as a joint venture of Stora and 
Kraftanlagen Heidelberg. Each company should invest approximately 75 million 
US$ to cover the costs of the conversion. As Kraftanlagen Heidelberg realised, 
however, that it would have to advance more than 50 million Euro, but would 
receive orders of only 2,5 to 5 million Euro itself and would have to subcontract 
most of the construction orders because it had no corresponding production 
facilities, it was no longer willing to take this financial risk. 
3. Having realised its limited benefits obtainable from the ASAM process and 
experiencing declining profits, Kraftanlagen Heidelberg in 1994 sold the pilot plant 
and the ASAM technology to the Austrian companies Voest-Alpine and Austrian 
Energy & Environment, that had developed a recovery technology already. In the 
then newly founded Asam Technologie GmbH, operating the pilot plant, 
Kraftanlagen Heidelberg remained a silent partner with a 15% share, whereas 
Voest-Alpine possessed 51% and Austrian Energy & Environment 34%. However, 
being involved in various pulp and paper production activities, both companies 
developed no subsequent action program to look for an industrial scale application 
of the ASAM process. Furthermore, in 1995 Voest-Alpine sold its pulp division to 
the US-American company Ingersoll-Rand, where it became incorporated as Impco-
Voest-Alpine in its pulping division Impco. Again, the new owners wanted first to 
evaluate the perspectives of the ASAM process before taking any investment 
decisions. 
4. In 1994/95 the modification of the pulp mill at Kelheim, which had gone bankrupt in 
1993, as described below, in order to establish the ASAM process on an industrial 
scale was seriously discussed. The interested investor Landecker, owning large 
pulp mills and plants producing pulp and paper-making machines in the USA, was 
willing to contribute 15 million Euro, if the Bavarian state government would provide 
another 50 million Euro initially indicated in view of the anyhow upcoming 
decommissioning costs. After the disappointing experiences with the new pulping 
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process Organocell there existed understandable reservations, in general, to 
heavily invest in another new pulping process still unproven on an industrial scale, 
too. So, when the Bavarian state government after having postponed this decision 
finally offered only around one quarter of the subsidies envisaged first, and parallel 
attempts to reanimate the Organocell process at Kelheim continued, being initiated 
by the trustee in bankruptcy, these potential investors withdrew, and Landecker 
invested in different industries in North America. 
5. In 1996 the US-American corporation Beloit, in particular producing papermaking 
machines, bought Impco from Ingersoll-Rand. This was connected with a renewed 
willingness to consider new projects seriously. However, with decreasing pulp 
prices the economic basis was no longer given for an investment of 30 million $ 
envisaged to introduce the ASAM process at the pulp factory Longview Fibers in 
the USA. 
6. In 1996-98 the Swedish pulp and paper producer SCA (Svenska Cellulosa), which 
had bought up PWA and thereby the pulp and paper mill at Stockstadt in 1991 and 
which was strategically approached by Asam Technologie GmbH because it owned 
3 sulfite pulp mills and only 1 kraft pulp mill, was considering to change the pulp 
mill at Stockstadt towards the ASAM process in combination with a new recovery 
technology based on pyrolysis. SCA was prepared to invest 150 million Euro into 
this modified plant producing 500 tons pulp daily42; however, Beloit as the supplier 
of the new machinery had to bear the risk. Corresponding insurance concepts were 
already negotiated with the big insurance company Allianz. In order to get all the 
patents concerning the ASAM process Beloit purchased the 34% share in ASAM 
Technologie GmbH from Austrian Energy & Environment in early 1998. Asam 
Technologie GmbH would have to care for basic engineering tasks in this industrial-
scale project. Finally, it was not realised, however, because Beloit made extreme 
losses in its export of papermaking machines to Asia, and was therefore no longer 
able to take the financial risk required by SCA. 
7. As mentioned above, the South African pulp and paper producer Sappi (South 
African pulp and paper industries) since 1999 has been investigating a recovery 
technology based on pyrolysis on an industrial scale. In case of successful results 
the test of the ASAM process on a industrial scale might well still occur in a not to 
distant future. 
The reason for the failure of market introduction of the ASAM process can be seen in a 
combination of the following factors. The relevant innovation promoters cared for 
successful technol gical development and economic market analysis, but were not 
sufficiently aware of the problem related to the risk capital needed for market 
introduction. In view of the failure of the Organocell process potent investors have been 
hesitant to be first on the market with a new pulping technology if their return on 
investment cannot be expected within five years or so. Because of considerable 
(environmental) improvements of the (modified) kraft process the ASAM process may 
                                         
42 As a further step, SCA even thought of building a completely new pulp mill for 550 million Euro with 
an even higher production capacity of 800 tons per day. 
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well claim to possess technical and economic qualities equal but not clearly superior to 
it. Therefore it appears reasonable for a pulp producer to rely on well known and 
proven processes and installations when a new pulp mill is built just every few years on 
the world, especially on a highly competitive pulp market with fluctuating prices and not 
unusual bankruptcies.43 Furthermore the major patents of the ASAM process are 
meanwhile owned by US American companies, whereas Scandinavian companies 
typically offer cheaper construction of pulp mil s than these American corporations. 
Consequently, the latter ones are less interested in introducing the ASAM process 
because they do not have these patents, so that it appears economically unfavourable 
to build a pulp mill based on the ASAM process in Europe. 
To sum up, against the background of rising environmental concern about and 
regulation of pulp production two quite independent environmental innovations were 
developed and tested in different plants of the pulp and cardboard factory at Baienfurt 
close to lake Konstanz in the late 1970s, and in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Both 
received considerable support by public funding. The first innovation to absorb 
ligneous compounds by aluminium oxide failed for technical reasons (corrosion of the 
recovery plant), and was therefore abandoned. The second comparatively 
comprehensive innovation, the ASAM process, proved to be technically viable but 
failed up to the present to be introduced on an industrial scale for various situational 
economic reasons. After its successful development in a pilot plant further 
improvements concerning recovery technology and bleaching processes were 
developed via cooperation of the key university institute which first developed the 
ASAM process and private pulp-related (machine producing) corporations without 
public funding anymore. 
3.3 Kelheim 
As in Baienfurt, two (or even three) different pulp-related R&D projects tried to 
implement the environmental technologies developed in the pulp mill at Kelheim. The 
first one concerns bleaching of sulfite pulp by means of oxygen and intensified chlorine 
dioxide treatment to eliminate use of chlorine, and the improvement of the existing 
thermal wastewater treatment plant, evaporating and burning cooking and bleaching 
effluents, to reduce specifi  wastewater volume and COD level, successfully carried out 
by the Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg AG (PWA) from around 1977 to 1984 
though without continuation of this specific bleaching arrangement when German pulp 
mills changed to TCF bleaching in 1990/91, as described above. The second one 
concerns the development and upscaling to an industrial level of the Organocell 
process as an alternative pulping process based on methanol and caustic soda, which 
was developed by the company Organocell and other (sub-) subsidiaries of the MD-
Verwaltungsgesellschaft from 1977 through 1993. The Organocell process failed at the 
                                         
43 Typically, the process to convince other people of the advantages of the ASAM process, so that they 
are prepared to decide in favour of corresponding investments, seems to b harder within a (large) 
corporation, where they immediately tend to ask after the profits to be gained, than in external debate. 
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operational level for various reasons leading to bankruptcy of the associated company 
Organocell in 1993. Afterwards some negotiations took place around 1994/95 to modify 
the still existing Kelheim pulp mill for introducing the ASAM process on an industrial 
scale there, but led to no positive result, as described in the previous section. 
3.3.1 High pressure oxygen bleaching 
Induced by the request of the Bavarian environmental authorities in 1976 to present 
concepts and plans to improve wastewater quality of the Kelheim pulp mill, located at 
the Danube river, the PWA and its subsidiary, the Bayerische Zellstoff AG operating 
this pulp mill, established an environmental protection project designed to better catch 
cooking liquor and to eliminate of C-bleaching. The introduction of high pressure O-
bleaching of sulfite pulp based on magnesium oxide (MgO) was first tested in 
laboratory experiments in 1977/78, in close collaboration with a professor from 
Trondheim, Norway, who owned a crucial patent mentioned below, a planning and 
consulting institute at Aschaffenburg and the research unit of SCA in Sweden. Oxygen 
bleaching under high pressure was selected becaus  it had been already developed 
for kraft pulping by Sappi and corresponding experiences already existed in 6 kraft 
mills in 1977, because the yet untested application of MgO appeared to be feasible, 
too, according to a patent in Norway, because Z-bleaching was not yet tested in 
practice, and because P-bleaching appeared to be too expensive and to lead to 
problems in producing dissolving pulp. 
Afterwards cooking and bleaching plants of the pulp mill in particular were strongly 
modified, what required corresponding comparatively rapid (informal and formal) 
approval procedures from 1978 through 1981. Because of delays in construction work 
and delivery dates O-bleaching started in 1981 only and was investigated further until 
1984 with successful results, in principle, though bleaching costs increased by at least 
15 Euro per ton pulp and pulp properties tended to show a slightly reduced brightness 
level, a lower viscosity range, increased hydrolytical degradation accompanied by 
reduced delignification, which in turn called for intensified D-bleaching (Partbauer et al. 
1984). Considerable manpower of the Bayerische Zellstoff AG, PWA and external 
(supply) companies went into the environmental protection project. Total project costs 
(between 1977 and 1983/84), including additional personnel training, amounted to 26 
million Euro, with 19,5 million Euro (75%) attributed to the R&D project on O-bleaching 
and 8 million Euro provided by the BMFT via PTWT. In view of the considerably large 
additional bleaching costs outside the Kelheim pulp mill the high pressure O-bl aching 
technique was not used for sulfite pulp production and thus experienced no diffusion at 
all. It is common practice now in kraft pulp production under lower pressure and with 
medium consistency using high shear mixers for oxygen addition. 
In view of lacking profitability of the Kelheim pulp mill producing dissolving grade 
market pulps its owner PWA intended to close down it a few years later. Finally, the 
Bayerische Zellstoff AG was taken over by the Organocell GmbH in 1988, which 
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reconstructed the pulp mill facilities in order to introduce the Organocell process at an 
industrial level. 
3.3.2 Development of the Organocell process 
The basic idea of the Organocell process is to cook and delignify wood by organic 
solvents and thereby to avoid sulphur and chlorine use in pulp production, to 
economically produce the pulp quality required for modern paper production in smaller 
plants with higher productivity, and to produce marketable lignin as a by-product of the 
pulping process (DLR 1990, 1991, Dahlmann/Thiel 1989, Edel 1989, Jaakko Pöyry 
1997). In its original concept a two-stage alkaline pulping process of methanol-water 
extraction and soda-anthraquinone (AQ) cooking was applied.44 Concerning machinery 
equipment and chemical reactions, the Organocell process resembles the kraft 
process, however, substituting sulphur by methanol to separate lignin. The other 
characteristics are not necessarily connected with the Organocell process, because it 
can be realised by evaporating and burning lignin in the conventional way, too, and 
because its pulp also tends to require several bleaching stages and TCF bleaching 
cannot be applied as easily as after the sulfite process. Thus, the main machinery 
represents conventional technology except for methanol handling in the evaporation 
and cooking, and even these systems are in use elsewhere in the chemical industry, 
and the recovery boiler, which again represents old sulfite technology of liquor burning. 
In principle, the Organocell process can supply dissolving, fluff and paper grade pulp. 
The advantages of the Organocell process refer to the applicability to different sorts of 
wood, the potential use of extracted (sulphur-free) lignin, the non-use of sulphur 
because of its environmental impacts, and the eventually achievable high quality of 
pulp produced. In practice, however, neither the attempts to extract and market lignin 
(cf. Wittner 1988, Jaakko Pöyry 1997:106) nor the efforts to produce paper grade pulp 
of the aspired quality proved to be successful. The difficulties of the Organocell 
process relate to its considerable engineering problems with upscaling, particularly the 
achievability of high quality paper grade pulp, the rather high volumes of water and 
soda required complicating their recycling and recovery, the many bleaching stages 
required for TCF bleaching, the high pressure required for the digester (above 13 bar), 
and to its doubtful economic profitability. 
The story of the Organocell process can be described as follows. During the mid 1970s 
the ecologically oriented co-owner Nicolaus of the MD-Papierfabriken at Dachau, near 
Munich, interpreted the first oil crisis as a sign of future scarcity of raw materials, 
including pulp, listened to a presentation of Kleinert, the inventor of the environmentally 
friendly Kleinert process to produce pulp using aqueous alcohols and afterwards 
checked the feasibility of the technique on site in Canada. For these reasons he 
prepared a project proposal intended to enable his paper mill to supply its own pulp. 
This could not be achieved economically by conventional pulping processes because 
                                         
44 This two-stage process was replaced by a one-stage AQ cooking with methanol as an additional 
solvent in the Kelheim pulp mill for (doubtful) economic reasons. 
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of the necessary production volumes required, which were beyond the scope of 
comparatively small-scale paper producers such as MD-Papierfabriken.45 The pilot 
project was funded by the BMFT via DLR contributing 50% of project costs in 1977 
through 1980, as were the subsequent upscaling projects in the pilot plant in 1981 
through 1983, and by building a demonstration plant in 1984 through 1989, summing 
up to altogether more than 10 million Euro of R&D grants, including two projects at both 
Munich universities addressing lignin extraction and utilization. In addition, the EU 
Commission granted close to another 500.000 Euro for two other projects concerning 
lignin utilization, too. ETP was quite optimistic and therefore keen to support 
development of the Organocell process because a small paper factory with a turnover 
of around 150 million Euro was willing to undertake considerable investments, and 
because the professional statements and, later on, advertising campaigns of its 
proponents sounded very favourable, although they could hardly be assessed 
thoroughly by BMFT officials. 
The first R&D project with a size of 2,15 million Euro developing the Organocell 
process in a newly built pilot plant, costing 0,8 million Euro, was done in cooperation 
with an external engineering consultant. It took more than one year until the pilot plant 
was built in Pasing/Munich in 1978, operated by the MD-Papierfabriken Dachau, a 
partial subsidiary of the MD-Verwaltungsgesellschaft, which was bought up by Burda 
partly (28%) in the mid 1970s and completely (100%) in the mid 1980s.46 Because the 
pilot plant did not work well, it was modified, where a new pump ordered could be 
delivered after 6 months only. Whereas the external consulting engineer wanted to test 
three differing pulping techniques, the project leader of MD-Papierfabriken focused on 
the Organocell process. In turn, this R&D cooperation was finished. Trials with pulping 
processes based solely on ethanol or on a one-stage acid ethanol cooking process 
following the Kleinert process proved to be technically unviable. After one year of 
unsuccessful experimenting the idea of a two-stage pulping process consisting of an 
acid and an alkaline part, patented in 1982, offered a possible solution in 1980.
In the second R&D project with a size of 1,55 million Euro a break-through was realised 
so that pulp of good sulfite quality could be produced for the first time though on the 
laboratory scale only, whereas the experiments to optimise the pilot plant involving 
about 5 persons were continued. Whereas the ordinary paper producing staff remained 
sceptical on the Organocell process, the development team was optimistic about its 
further development and - with the project leader belonging to the works council at the 
same time - convinced Nicolaus as co-owner of MD-Papierfabriken to decide in favour 
of further investment in a demonstration plant. For this purpose the Organocell GmbH 
was founded in 1984, as a 74% subsidiary of the Technocell AG and a 26% subsidiary 
of the MD-Papierfabriken, both being at that time themselves 51% or 75% subsidiaries 
of the MD-Verwaltungsgesellschaft. 
                                         
45 Interestingly, Jaakko Pöyry (1997) in their comparative assessment of different pulping processes 
came to the conclusion that a pulp mill based on the Organocell process has to have a production 
capacity at least as large as conventional ones. 
46 The MD-Verwaltungsgesellschaft also owns 75% of MD-Papierfabriken. 
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This demonstration plant was built and tested as a small-scale pulp mill with a pulp 
production capacity of 5 tons per day between 1984 and 1989.47 Its costs came to 
about 16 million Euro, again with 50% being co-funded by the BMFT via DLR in two 
projects, lasting from 1984 to 1987, and from 1987 to 1989. About 30 people wer  
involved in operating the plant. Now full-scale pulp production had to be tested in order 
to prove the viability of the Organocell process, where pulping and recovery processes 
(particularly of soda48 and methanol) had to be harmonized. Furthermore the s paration 
and reprocessing of accumulating lignin had to be developed, which was mainly done 
by PhD and diploma students at different universities.49 Related efforts to find a market 
for lignin, be it chemical, fertilizer, pharmaceutical, even cigarette ndus ry, or feed 
producers, indicated considerable market potentials, led to actual contacts with 
prospective customers, but ultimately failed to open the door to substantial sales 
because of excessively high prices of the reprocessed lignin envisaged. The 
demonstration plant was completed in 1985. Extensive experiments were made with 
both the one-stage and the two-stage cooking process. The bleaching process, 
substituting chlorine by oxygen and chlorine dioxide as bleaching agents, was limited to 
three stages resulting in a brightness of only 85%. The demonstration plant met quite 
some operational problems such as clogged tubings, corroded membranes or deficient 
flap-valves, common for new technical plants, and had to be largely reengineered. Also 
the quality of the pulp produced varied. It was difficult to continuously operate the 
demonstration plant for longer periods of several days. Only from 1988 onward it could 
be operated continuously in three shifts. Nevertheless, the experiments demonstrated 
in 1987/88 that the Organocell process was technically feasible and able to produce 
pulp of acceptable quality, even though its upscaling to an industrial scale would 
involve considerable further development efforts.50 
With promising R&D results of the demonstration plant in mind, the Organocell GmbH 
and its parent companies negotiated with PWA in 1987 to buy the Bayerische Zellstoff 
AG operating the pulp mill at Kelheim. This was a favourable option to pursue because 
this pulp mill produced different types of pulp, because its staff could be taken over, 
because relevant infrastructural supply was already provided, because it was not too 
far from Munich, because the Organocell GmbH had to be the first on the market in 
order to significantly benefit from its developm nt of the Organocell process, and 
because the Bavarian government was willing to subsidize the necessary 
reconstructions with up to 50 million Euro in view of the diverse negative economic and 
social impacts of closing the Kelheim pulp mill, as intended by PWA. In 1988 the 
Organocell GmbH took over the Bayerische Zellstoff AG, backed by considerable 
                                         
47 The decision in favour of such a smaller plant largely resulted  from the possibility to build it in the 
Pasing factory again, whereas the alternative option to build a 40-ton-per-day plant would have 
imposed the need to change to another location. 
48 In fact, soda was never recycled by causticization in the demonstration plant. 
49 A further dissertation at Graz university studied the usefulness of hemicelluloses. 
50 No external partners were actively involved in this development process because corresponding 
attempts were made only rarely and offers to support development were even turned down, because 
one was afraid to give away internal know-how or potential candidates expected a return on their 
investments already after few years. 
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financial support of 7 million Euro, and founded, together with Thyssen Rheinstahl 
Technik, a subsidiary of Thyssen, the Organocell Thyssen GmbH, with each party 
bringing in 50% of the capital stock. The Organocell Thyssen GmbH had the task to 
plan, erect and operate Organocell plants, i.e. in Kelheim. 
The reconstruction of the Kelheim pulp mill on the basis of the Organocell process was 
planned and approved from 1988 through 1990 and carried out from 1990 through 
1992.51 During that period there were significant technical and personal changes, which 
decisively contributed to the later failure of the Kelheim pulp mill, its reasons being 
explained subsequently. 
1. The new managers, coming from the side of Thyssen or hired subsequently, 
adhered to a somewhat different perspective of technology implementation than the 
development team at Pasing, favoured sophisticated information technology 
equipments, but had limited technical competence of genuine pulp processing 
technology. This led to differences in the approach and design of the Kelheim plant 
within the planning process and to its inferior design, in the end. 
2. Their planning attitudes tended to increase costs because the newly founded 
company Organocell Thyssen GmbH could add 10% to the reconstruction costs as 
planning expenditures, and because they were sometimes not aware of inexpensive 
suppliers of equipment because of their limited know-how in the field. 
Consequently, the projected costs rose from 75 million Euro, calculated by the 
project managers at Pasing in 1987, to be spent mainly the for the cooking plant 
and the recovery boiler which had to be purchased, over 125 million Euro total 
costs in official estimates in 1988/89, as opposed to internal estimates of 175 
million Euro, to 325 million Euro in the end. When the Organocell GmbH declared 
itself bankrupt in 1993, the corresponding liabilities amounted to 355 million Euro. 
Whereas the Technocell AG invested 60 million Euro, the banking consortium 
associated with the Kelheim project finally provided credits over 290 million Euro.52 
3. Beyond these economic considerations just presented, personal interests in gaining 
income from patents may well have contributed to he change from the originally 
planned and tested two-stage cooking process back to a one-stage cooking 
process in the Kelheim plant. The managing director of the Technocell AG, one 
managing director of both the Organocell GmbH and the Organocell Thyssen 
GmbH, being a former patent attorney of the Technocell AG and a friend of the 
former one, and one chemist hired by him took out a patent for this modified one-
stage cooking process, whereas the managing director of both the Organocell 
GmbH and the Bayerische Zellstoff GmbH as the technically competent project 
leader of the demonstration plant held the patent for the two-stage cooking process. 
                                         
51 Particularly during this period of time considerable marketing efforts were made to convince credit 
grantors and a sceptical pulp community of the advantages of the Organocell process and to raise 
sufficient investment capital for modifying and operating the Kelheim pulp mill correspondingly. This 
led to an overselling of the technical, economic and ecological quality features of the Pasing 
demonstration plant and, later, of the Kelheim pulp mill, and to unfair criticism of the environmental 
performance of existing sulfite pulp mills. 
52 For this reason the subsidies provided by the Bavarian state government remained limited. And for a 
plant on an industrial scale the BMFT was not permitt d to supply additional grants. 
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Although the viability of this latter process on an industrial scale would still have to 
be demonstrated, the one-stage cooking process - at least without a further acid 
washing process unfortunately, however, leading to problems of materials corrosion 
- clearly could not deal with manganese stemming from pine wood destroying 
peroxide applied in bleaching. And experiments in the pilot plant in 1983 had 
already indicated that the one-stage cooking process was only capable to produce 
acceptable fluff pulp, but not adequate paper grade pulp. In any case, the change 
in the technical design of the Organocell process when upscaling it to an industrial 
level for the first time necessarily implied a high additional risk of failure because 
upscaling from a demonstration plant to an industrial plant typically already leads to 
considerable adaptation problems without such alterations.53 
4. These discrepancies in perspective and interest led to discord and also intrigues 
between the managing directors. Their results were that the crucial figure, the 
managing director of the Technocell AG, was no longer open to technical warnings 
and criticism, or a neutral expertise voiced or suggested by the project leaders of 
the Pasing demonstration plant. Furthermore, these latter one lost their authorities 
in the Kelheim mill reconstruction project and left the corporation in 1989 and 1990, 
respectively; in addition the expertise of the staff at Pasing acquired by 10 years of 
development work deliberately was not brought in into the Kelheim project. Finally, 
a later law suit on patent compensation lasting for three years was won by the 
former project leader and managing director, but could not be realised by him 
because of the bankruptcy situation. 
5. Apart from changes in the technical design the Kelheim pulp mill was bothered by 
mechanical faults, exceptional machinery, and sloppy design of piping in no way 
related to the process- pecific features, leading to frequent shut downs with pro-
duction losses of 70% during the first year of its operation. The fluff pulp produced 
was suitable for hygienic products, but the paper grade pulp was plagued by the 
results of unstable operation and low strength. Discrepancies between the already 
existing facilities and the for economic reasons enlarged nominal pulp production 
capacity from 110.000 to 150.000 tons per year54 resulted in serious misfits 
between different installation components, including insufficient power supply.
6. The digester supplied by the company Kamyr, the world market leader of kraft proc-
ess cooking and bleaching plants, was not designed appropriately mainly because 
of insufficient supply of techni al data from the Pasing demonstration plant, leading 
to disruptions and break-downs during operation of the Kelheim pulp mill. 
7. Chemicals recovery in the recovery boiler met many difficulties, for instance broken 
pipes, ash accumulation, drum level control, superheater drains, or the green liquor 
system, which were again largely due to inappropriate design specifications already 
leading to various modifications of the recovery boiler by the package supplier 
                                         
53 Significantly, the expert opinion commissioned by the credit granting banks after bankruptcy of the 
Kelheim mill clearly stated that the main reason for the bankruptcy was not the Organocell process, 
but the inferior design of the mill. 
54 Nature and monument protection activists lobbied for a limitation to 90.000 tons per year in order to 
keep the size of the pulp mill small enough to avoid disturbance of the view onto the Danube river. 
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Steinmüller who provided the whole recovery system and guaranteed its reliable 
operation. 
8. Depressed pulp prices of 350 Euro per ton55 did not allow the Bayerische Zellstoff 
AG, operating the Kelheim pulp mill, to cover its production costs even if the mill 
had reached full capacity and optimal performance, whereas the Organocell 
Thyssen GmbH assumed to be able to sell high quality dissolving pulp for 600 Euro 
per ton, which the pulping process applied, however, did not yield. 
In 1992 the reconstructed pulp mill at Kelheim started test operation, but had toe s ut
down again already in 1993 for economic reasons resulting particularly from many 
unexpected standstills, leading to bankruptcy of the Bayerische Zellstoff AG, and in 
turn of their parent and holding companies, the Organocell GmbH and the Technocell 
GmbH. Reinforced by the critical expert opinions taken to assess the reasons of this 
failure, the Burda group owing the MD-Verwaltungsgesellschaft was not prepared to 
invest about another 50 million Euro, required to cover the losses conceivable for the 
next two years, and the necessary technical rearrangements. 
From 1993 to 1996, in the aftermath of the shut down of the Kelheim mill, the credit 
granting banks commissioned experts to evaluate its failure reasons and the economic 
prospects of its further operation, and insisted on the liability of the Technocell GmbH 
beyond the limited liability of the Bayerische Zellstoff AG of only 45 million Euro in or-
der to minimise their losses. Accompanied by considerable controversial debate, quite 
some efforts were made by various actors concerned, well beyond the trustee in bank-
ruptcy, the (largely communal) Donaupark GmbH, to find new investors and operators 
for the Kelheim mill: either to adjust the Organocell process by selling reprocessed 
lignin, too, or to introduce the ASAM process, or to sell machinery equipment to Indo-
nesia,56 or finally to sell the pulp mill in 1996 for dismantling it. Because the latter 
operation would cost still more than 50 million Euro and the Bavarian state government 
or local municipalities have been unwilling to provide considerable subsidies for this 
purpose, dismantling has been only partly performed up to the present.57 
To sum up: the environmental technologies introduced in the Kelheim pulp mill did not 
survive on the market in spite of their technical viability, in principle. 
High pressure oxygen bleaching was too costly and not applied elsewhere for sulfite 
pulp. 
Based on the conviction and engagement of the former owner of the MD-Papierfabriken 
and the responsible project director, he Organocell process could be successfully 
developed in Pasing/Munich within about a decade though with still diverging 
                                         
55 Pulp prices are primarily fixed in US $ on the world market. Thus, in 1993 already a low $/DM 
exchange rate led to low pulp prices in Germany. 
56 The Swiss project management company already involved in the insolvency process and commissio-
ned to do so proved to be unable to pay the 11 million Euro agreed upon for the sale. 
57 Meanwhile considerable waste residues from 110 years of pulp production have been detected in the 
ground, and about 17 million Euro, mainly provided by the Bavarian state government, have been 
spent for corresponding waste management efforts until late 2000. From 2001 onward the Donaupark 
GmbH intends to take possession of the site for free and to make it an industrial district. 
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assessments of its technical and economic viability. Corresponding professional debate 
was at least partly missing in this respect. Nei her parallel advancements in sulfite and 
kraft pulping solving the problem of unwanted sulphur emission nor trade-offs between 
pulp bleaching requirements and abstention from acid washing, demanding sulphur of 
chlorine compounds, were seriously taken into account. 
The Organocell process failed on the industrial scale, the reasons being organisational 
mismanagement and severe personal conflicts, the associated non-utilization of 
competence and experience available from the preceding R&D projects, the change in 
the cooking process and inferior design of the plant, frequent shut downs because of 
various significant technical operation problems leading to extremely poor financial 
performance, insufficient development of and investments in marketable lignin y-
products, drastic price decrease of pulp, and the unwillingness of potential investors to 
make the necessary additional investments in order to improve effective capacity and 
pulp quality of the Kelheim pulp mill, because of obvious risks concerning thei  not only 
short term but even long term profitability. 
3.4 Other environmental R&D projects in Germany 
In order to contextualize and to put into perspective the case studies on environmental 
innovations in pulp production presented in the previous sections, other environmental 
R&D projects and the role of public funding as well as the overall features of pulp-
related attempts towards environmental innovation in Germany are summarized in this 
section, whereas the subsequent one gives an overview of related efforts outside 
Germany. 
The overall picture of environmental R&D projects can be described as one where quite 
diverse concepts were developed and tested in (university) research laboratories, in 
pilot plants and in pulp mills by separate as well as by joint projec s of academic and 
industrial R&D groups, which received (partial) public funding in the late 1970s and 
1980s mainly from the BMFT, but also from state ministries. Interestingly, the R&D 
projects addressed to varying degrees all relevant dimensions of an ecologically sound 
pulp production process in the 1970s already, i.e. wastewater treatment by various 
purification techniques, substitution of chlorine bleaching, development of new 
(chemical) cooking and delignification processes, and closing pulp processing cycles 
by chemicals and energy recovery systems as well as minimising wastewater effluents 
and external energy inputs. Further environmental impacts of (sulfite) pulp production 
such as wood handling, atmospheric emissions or noise have been dealt with more 
routinely in order to successively reduce them.58 
Frequently, these projects were initiated because of environmental problem pressure 
perceived and accepted as significant, in combination with the possibility to thereby 
                                         
58 Environmental improvements of (energy-intensive) mechanical pulping and chemi-mechanical pul-
ping, recovered paper processing, papermaking and related processes are not dealt with in this study, 
and environmental improvements of the kraft (sulphate) pulping process were mainly developed 
outside Germany for reasons already indicated and summarized in th  subsequent section. 
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reduce wastewater levies according to the AbwAG. Indeed, nearly all pulp mills 
received some public funding for environment-related R&D projects,59 which are not 
listed here completely (see cf. DLR 1990, 1991, 1996, Kernforschungszentrum 
Karlsruhe 1990). Few of these projects result d in economically viable technologies, 
and even they were not taken over by other pulp mills until required to fulfill certain 
environmental (emission) standards by corresponding environmental regulation. 
Examples of technical innovations not successful on the market are ozone bleaching in 
the sulfite process (small scale experiments at Stockstadt), high pressure oxygen 
bleaching (Kelheim)60, chemicals recovery by pyrolysis (Ehingen), wastewater 
treatment by aluminium oxide (Baienfurt), and the newly developed ASAM, Formacell, 
or Organocell pulping processes. 
As described by Jaakko Pöyry (1997) the Formacell process, being a further 
development of the Acetocell process after 1992, still is in a rather initial development 
phase. The latter process has only been tested in a pilot plant in Gschwend near 
Stuttgart 1989- 3, but not yet at the level of a demonstration plant. Supported by some 
public funding, the continuous development efforts, pursued since about 1984 by Nimz 
and collaborators at the BFH in Hamburg as the pioneers of the Formacell process, 
resulted in the technical design of a corresponding demonstration plant in 1994/95. 
However, no investor was found, and the Veba Oel AG, which in 1991 completely took 
over the Acetocell GmbH, operating the pilot plan , terminated its marketing efforts of 
the Acetocell process in 1995. In principle at least, the Formacell process, which uses 
acetic acid and formic acid as dissolving agents, and ozone in acetic acid and - for 
higher degrees of brightness - peracetic acid in butyl acetate within the bleaching 
process and produces paper grade pulp as well as dissolving pulp, can be performed in 
a completely closed system with a chemicals recovery process differing from 
conventional techniques, and without wastewater, and could thus lead to a radical 
change in processing techniques and the technology of pulp production. At present, 
however, there exist no chances to introduce this new pulping technology in the 
market, as the problems of its practical application at the large-scale level appear to be 
enormous and the pulp and paper industry showed and shows no interest in the 
Formacell process. 
Whereas P-bleaching and Z-bleaching for environmental reasons were first developed 
in Germany in the 1970s, experiments with O-bleaching, more suitable for kraft pulping, 
were pursued in Sweden first and in South Africa by Sappi. Corresponding projects at 
Kelheim and Alfeld were co-funded by the BMFT and UBA, respectively, in the 1980s 
only (Partbauer et al. 1984, Dalpke 1989). Furthermore, in the early 1980s the BMFT 
funded via PTWT two research projects focusing on Z-bleaching, where trials in a pilot 
                                         
59 Thus, one may notice that closed cycle technologies were already developed in the late 1970s, and 
that P-bleaching was also tried for ground wood pulp by the paper technology institute in Munich in 
1989 to 1991, funded by 160.000 Euro. 
60 This type of bleaching has been developed and patented by Sappi in South Africa in 1970. However, 
a much less expensive medium consistency low pressure version is current standard in kraft pulping. 
So its transfer to the sulfite process led to a combined application of oxygen and peroxide as 
implemented at the Ehingen plant. 
34 
plant at Stockstadt were performed in cooperation with the company Mannesmann-
Demag, which built the plant producing (quite expensive) ozon . These experiments 
showed that Z-bleaching requires a special technology and can be successfully applied 
under specific conditions (Patt/Wang 1981, Patt 1984). 
Within this ETP context UBA focussed - in accordance with the BMU - its funding on 
specific development and demonstration projects at Alfeld and Ehingen in the 1980s in 
order to clearly demonstrate the technical feasibility of certain bleaching and waste 
treatment technologies. As a consequence, German pulp mills changed to TCF 
bleaching in 1990/91 (Mannheim, already in 1989, Alfeld, Ehingen, Stockstadt, 
Baienfurt, and, later, Kelheim) or were shut down (Bonafort, Karlsruhe-Maxau, pulp 
mills of the former GDR).61 
Within the long-term, since 1982 ongoing corporate project "pollution-free factory" of 
the Hannoversche Papierfabriken AG, operating the integrated pulp and paper mill at 
Alfeld, which mainly aimed at wastewater treatment, utilisation of (wood) residues, 
chemicals recovery, and ECF bleaching, after continuous improvements of the digest-
ing, bleaching and wastewater treatment processes in 1986 to 1989 an ECF bleaching 
sequence EOP - H - P and, since 1990, the even TCF bleaching sequence EOP - P - P 
could be established in a demonstration bleaching plant.62 This development project 
was funded by UBA with 1,25 million Euro (50%) in 1985 to 1988, whereas the other 
1,25 million Euro provided by the company were set off against the wastewater levy63 
(Dalpke 1989). Similar to the Ehingen pulp mill, Degussa was the other main participant 
disposing of the necessary competence on peroxide production and handling. Patents 
deliberately could not be acquired within this project in order to pass on its experiences 
at least in German speaking EU countries. Whereas the responsible engineer even 
received threatening letters from actors opposing ECF and TCF bleaching, when the 
Alfeld pulp mill introduced (elemental) chlorine-free bleaching in 1986 and 1990, 
respectively, TCF bleaching of the type developed at Alfeld and Mannheim was quickly 
introduced in all German pulp mills in 1990/91 for reasons indicated above. Interest-
ingly, it should be denoted once more that the Hannoversche Papierfabriken AG, more 
than 50% of which had been taken over by the Swedish pulp and paper corporation 
NCB in the 1970s, bought te Schwäbische Zellstoff AG in Ehingen in 1987 and trans-
formed the mill into an integrated pulp and paper mill by adding a new paper machine. 
In 1992 Sappi bought 60% of both German mills for a very high price, and in 1993 most 
of the remaining shares. This example illustrates the strong competition and ongoing 
concentration process in the pulp and paper industry on a global scale. 
With economies of scale compensating gradual price decrease from 900 Euro per ton 
peroxide in 1980, Degussa as the world's second largest peroxide producer was able to 
considerably enlarge peroxide sales for pulp bleaching in the 1980s although it had no 
                                         
61 Kelheim and Baienfurt were shut down (for other reasons) in 1993 and 1999. 
62 This project introduced P-bleaching in the pre-bleaching stage, whereas at Ehingen it was introduced 
initially in the second bleaching stage. 
63 Only under this condition the company was prepared to carry out this development project. 
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monopoly position in that respect. In the 1990s, however, new competitors and 
corresponding overcapacities due to large public subsidies available for building (new) 
industrial plants in the former GDR led to strong price decrease for peroxide (500 and, 
at the lowest level, even below 300 Euro/t H2O2) and the closure of one peroxide 
production plant by Degussa in the late 1990s. In parallel to the growing international 
debate on AOX risks, initiated by the respective German debate, Degussa, apart from 
selling peroxide to pulp producers on the European market, became active in North 
America since the mid 1980s in order to substitute C-bl aching by combining P-
bleaching and D-bleaching for kraft pulp, too, and to convince even US pulp producers 
to do so. Meanwhile P-bleaching of kraft pulp - as one of several bleaching stages - is 
rather common in Scandinavia, Canada and Brazil, and meanwhile is also applied or 
close to be implemented in nearly all pulp mills in the USA. 
Thus, after the amendment of the AbwasserVwV annex 19 came into force in 1990 all 
German pulp mills, if not shut down, quickly changed to TCF bleaching within one 
year.64 The instant change to TCF bleaching omitting the intermediate step of ECF 
bleaching was mainly due to the fact that the new legal requirements on wastewater 
effluents made it cheaper to introduce new technological installations in pulp mills at 
once.65 Other environmental regulations such as the need to supervise chlorine storage 
according to the ordinance on hazardous substances (G fahrstoffverordnung) 
supported this change to TCF bleaching, too. Meanwhile, bleaching of sulfite pulp in 
Germany typically involves only two or even just one stage of combined oxygen and 
peroxide bleaching (EOP) and/or just peroxide bleaching (P) using NaOH. 
Furthermore, the reconstruction and change of the pulp mill of Rosenthal at 
Blankenstein to the modified kraft process wa  co-funded by large amounts of public 
funds available within the reconstruction program of the German government66 in th  
1990s, as outlined above. However, practically no genuine R&D funding was provided 
by ETP to also develop the modified kraft process,67 entially because of its complete 
lack in West Germany. 
Otherwise, public R&D funds clearly diminished to small amounts in the 1990s, after 
the essential environmental techniques had been developed.68 Subsequent (ongoing) 
                                         
64 One should bear in mind that this was possible because only sulfite pulp mills existed in Germany and 
sulfite pulp is much easier to bleach than kraft pulp.
65 Interestingly, just those key persons of the pulp and paper industry who fiercely opposed (stringent) 
AOX standards defended them as well as associated TCF bleaching on international symposia since 
1990, where for example North American pulp producers lobbied for readmission of C-bleaching in 
Germany. 
66 This program offered private investors huge public subsidies in case of adjusting existing or building 
new industrial plants in the states of the former GDR promising future competitive production. These 
policy efforts to rebuild East German economy led to both quite some successes and a lot of failures 
of such new plants. 
67 As described in the subsequent section, it was mainly developed in Scandinavian countries during the
1980s and 1990s. However, in collaboration with foreign companies, the main inventor of the ASAM 
process currently experiments with ozone-free bleaching in the kraft process, using only O-b eaching 
and P-bleaching. 
68 Already the report on water r search funded by the BMBF (Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe 1997) lists 
no pulp-related R&D projects anymore for the period 1990-96. Nevertheless, some public R&D funds 
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optimisation processes were funded by the pulp industry itself, although supported by 
the possibility to thereby reduce its wastewater levy. 
For instance, because of the orientation towards (hygienic) tissue products implying 
somewhat lower demands on fibre brightness a MgO-based bleaching technology 
could be developed and implemented in the Mannheim sulfite pulp mill between 1986 
and 1995. Replacing NaOH by Mg(OH)2 in the first bleaching stage and introducing 
single-stage bleaching permits closure of the bleach plant and involves further 
environmental advantages, too (Nimmerfroh et al. 1995). The development costs of ca. 
5 million Euro could be covered more or less by thereby reduced wastewater levies. 
It appears worth noting that different actors showed differing orientations with respect 
to the R&D projects they were engaged in: some were strongly convinced of the 
technical viability and optimisability of their favourite techniques though taking into 
account relevant economic and political aspects, for instance the leaders of the 
projects developing the Organocell process or the ASAM process; others were first of 
all concerned with the economic viability of a process which therefore certainly had to 
prove its technical feasibility, for instance the leaders of the projects developing 
peroxide bleaching at Alfeld and at Ehingen; key EP promoters, for instance in UBA, 
believed in the effectiveness of environmental policy regulations if giving due regard to 
their technical and economic viability with the help of appropriate technologies. 
Because technical and even more practical (social) problems allow always different 
reasonable solutions, controversy about the (relative) superiority of one or another 
technical arrangement and process is well justified in most cases (Ravetz 1971). As a 
consequence, the parallel development and competition of various (environmental) 
technologies in order to reduce environmental pollution in pulp production could be 
pursued for good reasons. 
The reverse of the medal is the enhanced probability of over-optimistic (false) 
pretences and insufficient technical expertise of participants in corresponding 
(scientific) judgements and debates. Examples thereof were the presentation of the 
ecological advantages of the Organocell process (envisaged) in the Kelheim pulp mill 
by its representatives in the late 1980s and early 1990s in corresponding business and 
political circles, or the presentation of high pressure oxygen bleaching, developed at 
Kelheim after 1980, as a success story much later by scientists evaluating ETP 
(ECOTEC 1988, Angerer et al. 1997) as well as by the responsible head of PTWT 
(Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe 1990) although this technique was nowhere further 
used in sulfite pulp mills for obvious economic reasons.69 
                                                                                                                              
are still spent, for instance for alternative pulping processes in the 1990s, namely variants of the 
Formacell process. 
69 This latter example clearly demonstrates the doubtful validity of secondary (case) studies carried out 
superficially by just one or two (telephone) interviews as well as the precarious reliability of 
statements by research project management bodies in case of combined information overload and 
time scarcity! 
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Summing up, one may well describe pulp-related environmental R&D over the last 25 
years as a sequence of projects, where well founded political and public environmental 
concern, (pending) environmental policy regulations, and extensive public funding 
induced considerable, parallel and manifold R&D efforts which frequently led to 
technically viable, but only partly to economically viable results. Nevertheless, together 
with environmental learning processes in the pulp industry, these R&D projects 
resulted, especially during the 1980s, in a technological trajectory of ecologically much 
sounder sulfite pulp processing (energy and chemicals recovery, TCF bleaching, 
sophisticated waste treatment, integrated production) in Germany than before so that 
emissions into water and air (COD, AOX, SO4; SO2, NOx) as well as the consumption 
of chemicals and energy have been drastically reduced per unit of pulp produced, 
typically by around 90% (Geisenheiner/Drieschmanns 2000). This whole process took 
place within the frame conditions of fierce competition on the world market, growing 
demand for paper products, typically strong price cycles for wood, pulp and paper, 
typically lasting 4 to 8 years, ongoing international economic concentration processes 
in the pulp and paper industry, and a rising share of recovered waste paper. 
Thus, best available techniques for sulfite pulp mills are considered to be (European 
Commission 2000:v- i): 
– "Dry debarking of wood; 
– Increased delignification before the bleach plant by extended or modified cooking; 
– Highly efficient brown stock washing and closed cycle brown stock screening; 
– Effective spill monitoring containment and recovery system; 
– Closure of the bleach plant when sodium based cooking processes are being used; 
– TCF bleaching; 
– Neutralising of weak liquor before evaporation foll wed by re-use of most conden-
sate in the process of anaerobic treatment; 
– For prevention of unnecessary loading and occasional upsets in the external efflu-
ent treatment due to process cooking and recovery liquors and dirty condensates 
sufficiently large buffer tanks for storage are considered necessary; 
– In addition to process-integrated measures and primary treatment biological treat-
ment is considered BAT for sulfite pulp mills." 
Table 2 lists them and their environmental impacts in somewhat more detail. 
3.5 Environmental R&D in other countries 
Although Germany clearly was a front- u ner in developing environmental technolo-
gies, though essentially limited to sulfite-bas d pulp production, clearly comparable 
R&D projects to improve environmental protection were carried out in many other 
countries as well, however primarily addressing dominant kraft pulping.70 Many of them 
were pursued in Scandinavian countries, which have both an internationally important 
pulp and paper industry and comparatively strict environmental standards and regula-
tions. 
                                         
70 Lenzing in Austria tested quite some variants in sulfite pulping. 
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Techniques to consider in the 
determination of BAT 












Dry debarking (see kraft) O ­ in debarking ¯ COD, ¯  
TSS, ¯  flow 
O O 
Extended cooking to a low kappa
Continuous (a) or batch (b) 
­ in cooking 
¯ in bleaching 
(­/¯) in cooking 
­ evaporation 
¯ COD O O 
Oxygen delignification  ­ in O2-stage 
¯ in bleaching 
­ in O2-stage 
¯ in bleaching 
¯ COD O O 
Closed screening (see kraft) O O ¯ COD O O 
Efficient washing and process control  
(see kraft) 
¯ in bleaching  
¯ in cooking 
­ washing 
(elec.) 
¯ O O 
Collection of allmost all spillages (see kraft) O ­ evaporation ¯ O O 
TCF bleaching (vs. ECF) 
(at the same incoming low kappa) 
(­/¯) (­/¯) (¯ COD), ¯  
AOX, ­ N 
chel. agent 
O O 




­ evaporation ¯ O O 
Closure of the bleach plant in sodium s. mills ¯ ¯ ¯ O O 
Neutralizing of weak liquor before evaporation  ­ O (­/¯) ¯ O 
Separate treatment of the condensates or re-us  
in the process 
O ¯ ¯ O O 
Buffer tanks for concentrated liquids  
(see kraft) 
O O ¯ O O 
Biological waste water treatment (see kraft) ­ ­ ­ (­/¯) odour Sludge 
burning ?
Installation of ESP and multi-stage scrubbers on 
the recovery boiler 
¯ ¯ O ¯ O 
Collection and incineration of odorous gases in 
the recovery boiler and/or in a venturi-washer 
O ­ O ¯ O 
Emission optimised recov ry boiler O O O ¯ O 
Low NOx auxiliary boilers (see kraft) O O O ¯ NOx O 
SNCR on bark boilers (see kraft) ­ urea ­ handling 
system 
O ¯ NOx O 
ESP on bark boiler (see kraft) O ­ electricity O ¯ dust O 
Emission optimised incineration of residues 
with energy recovery (see kraft) 
O ¯ heat recovery O (­/¯) ¯ 
Notes: ­ = increase; ¯= decrease; 0 = no (or negligible) effect. (­/¯) = may or may not have an effect/little 
impact depending on the conditions 
Table 2: Overview of available techniques in sulfite pulping and their impact on the 
environment and the mill performance, respectively (Source: European 
Commission 2000:141) 
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Significantly, these major environmental improvements were comprehensively applied 
within greenfield erections, in particular, where large investments permitted the applica-
tion of an overall ecological concept according to best international environmental stan-
dards, whereas in Germany mainly continuous, but necessarily limited environmental 
improvements by repairing and supplementing already existing (old) pulp mills 
predominated, except for thecomplete reconstruction of the Blankenstein mill.  
Whereas one main focus of environmental R&D addressing pulp production thus was 
on Scandinavian countries and Germany, further technological concepts and projects 
have also been developed in North America (cf. Norberg-Bohm/Rossi 1997, Rossi 
1998). Furthermore, other projects addressed different types of wood (processing) in 
Southern countries such as Brazil or Indonesia, and clearly, innovative adoptions of 
environmental technologies, already developed elswhere, occurred frequently, for 
instance ECF bleaching in Spain (Cuerda García-Junceda et al. 2000). Similar to 
Germany, a lot of public funding is characteristic for pulp related R&D projects in 
Sweden, Finland, or partly Canada, too, mainly focusing on kraft pulping for obvious 
reasons. And similarly, too, these environmental R&D projects addressed in particular 
chemicals and energy recovery, closure of pulp processing cycles, chlorine-free 
(oxygen and ozone) bleaching, wastewater treatment, and - p rticularly important for 
kraft pulping - the handling of gaseous sulphur compounds (emission of SO2 and 
H2S).The major result of these efforts was the so-called modified kraft process. 
Leaving aside mechanical and semi-chemical pulp with around a 20% share in world 
pulp production, its share in global chemical pulp production meanwhile amounts to 
20%, whereas conventional kraft pulping still accounts for about 60%, leaving 7% for 
sulfite pulp and 13% for other, mainly soda-based pulping processes, primarily used for 
annual plants. As for bleaching, unbleached kraft pulp still amounts to less than 25% of 
all kraft pulp produced, whereas ECF kraft pulp meanwhile accounts for about 50%, 
and TCF kraft pulp for clearly less than 10%. In Western Europe unbleached kraft pulp 
contributes around 20% to kraft pulp production. For sulfite pulp production TCF 
bleaching amounts to about 70% worldwide, and nearly 100% in Western Europe. 
According to Jaakko Pöyry (1997:160-162) the modified kraft process is characterised 
by low kappa numbers, modified (displacement) cooking processes, an oxygen delig-
nification stage, ECF and eventually TCF bleaching71, chemicals recovery, low water 
consumption by largely closed pulp processing systems, control and elimination of 
odour (sulphur compounds), and pulp production that is self- ufficient in energy supply. 
The modified kraft process, which can utilize all kinds of wood and produce paper, fluff 
and even dissolving pulp with required qualities, thus is able to satisfy environmental 
requirements, which makes it highly competitive because it is a technically and eco-
nomically well-established pulp production process. These various modifications of the 
kraft process were primarily developed and tested in Scandinavian countries since the 
                                         
71 Today, TCF bleaching is applied as standard procedure in just a few mills amounting to probably less 
than 5% for all kraft pulping worldwide. Only the Swedish company SCA exclusively uses TCF 
bleaching, though this is partly because it runs mainly sulfite mills. Taking into account all costs and 
quality aspects, it is doubted by numerous experts if ECF bleaching really is ecologically less 
advanced than TCF bleaching. 
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early 1980s and started to penetrate the world market since the late 1980s. However, 
these environmental improvements are less familiar in North America, Russia or Asia 
than in European countries. 
According to European Commission (2000:iii) best available techniqu s for kraft pulp 
mills are considered to be: 
– "Dry debarking of wood; 
– Increased delignification before the bleach plant by extended or modified cooking 
and additional oxygen stages; 
– Highly efficient brown stock washing and closed cycle brown stock screening; 
– Elemental chlorine free (ECF) bleaching with low AOX or totally chlorine-free (TCF) 
bleaching; 
– Recycling of some, mainly alkaline process water from the bleach plant; 
– Effective spill monitoring, containment and recovery system; 
– Stripping and reuse of the condensates from the evaporation plant; 
– Sufficient capacity of the black liquor evaporation plant and the recovery boiler to 
cope with the additional liquor and dry solids load; 
– Collection and reuse of clean cooling waters; 
– provision of sufficiently arge buffer tanks for storage of spilled cooking and 
recovery liquors and dirty condensates to prevent sudden peaks of loading and 
occasional upsets in the external effluent treatment plant; 
– In addition to process-integrated measures, primary treatment and biological 
treatment is considered BAT for kraft pulp mills." 
Table 3 lists them and their environmental impacts in somewhat more detail. 
The main alternative pulping process deployed outside Germany is the Milox process, 
which has been developed primarily in Finland. The Finnish pulp and paper research 
institute Keskuslaboratorio Oy developed the Milox process since 1984. It uses formic 
acid and hydrogen peroxide as main pulping chemicals in a sulphur-free th ee-stage 
cooking process, applies TCF bleaching based on peroxide, requires a rather complex 
recovery system of chemicals differing from conventional techniques, results in acetic 
acid and (potentially) sulphur-free lignin as by-products, and is suitable for leaf-wood 
and annual plants only. Together with the company Kemira Oy and the center for tech-
nological development (TEKES) a pilot plant, including a chemicals recovery plant later 
on, was built and tested in 1990 through 1993, followed by a feasibility study on a pulp 
mill using the Milox process in 1994. Up to the present, the Milox process like other 
pulping processes based on organic acids has not been introduced in the market of 
pulp production. It is estimated that there are limited advantages over existing pulping 
technologies, though large amounts of peroxide are required for bleaching because of 
high kappa numbers. 
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Candidate Best Available 
Techniques 
Effects on the consumption and emission level  
(cross-media effects) 












E.g. energy balance, 
yield, mill performance 
3.3.1 Dry debarking n.e. ­ in debarking ¯ COD 
¯ TSS 
¯ flow 
n.e. n.e. ­ energy generation in 
bark boilers 
3.3.2 Extended modified cooking to a low 
kappa 
Continuous (c) or batch (b) 
­ in cooking 
­ lime demand 
¯ in bleaching 
(­) cooking (c) 
¯ cooking (b) 
(­) evaporation, 
(­) lime kiln 
¯ COD 
¯ AOX 
­ odour n.e. ­ energy generation,  
(­/¯ ) final pulp yield  
3.3.3 Closed screening n.e. n.e. ¯ n.e. n.e. n.e. 
3.3.4 Oxygen delignification ­ in O2-stage 
¯ in bleaching 
­ O2-stage 




¯ n.e. (­) dregs (­ energy generation) 
3.3.5 Ozone bleaching  ­ in O3-stage 
¯ in bleaching 
­ O3-stage 
­ O3 generation 
¯ in bleaching 
¯ n.e. n.e. n.e. 
3.3.6 ECF bleaching technique (vs. TCF) 1) 
(at same incoming low Kappa) 
(­/¯ ) (­/¯ ) ­ AOX 
­ ClO3- 
­ Cl2 n.e. n.e. 
3.3.7 TCF bleaching technique (vs. ECF) 1) 
(at same incoming low Kappa) 
(­/¯ ) (­/¯ ) (¯ COD) 
¯ AOX 
­ N chelat. 
agent) 
n.e. n.e. n.e.(¯  pulp yield) 
3.3.8. Partly closure of the bleach plant + 
increased evaporation 
­ bleaching ­ evaporation ¯ (­) (­ dregs) (¯ water consumption) 
3.3.9 Collection of allmost all spillages n.e. (­ evaporation) ¯ n.e. n.e. n.e. 




¯ n.e. n.e.  
3.3.11 Stripping and re-use of condensates ¯ in bleaching ­ steam ¯ COD, N ¯ odour n.e. n.e. 
3.3.12 Buffer tanks for concentrated liquids n.e. n.e. ¯ n.e. n.e. n.e. 
3.3.13 Biological waste water treatment ­ ­ ¯ (­odour) ­ Sludge burning ? 
3.3.14 Tertiary treatment (precipitation) ­ ­ ¯ n.e. ­ Sludge burning ? 
3.3.15 Increase of DS of black liquor n.e. ­ evaporation n.e. ¯ SO2 
(­ NOx) 
n.e. ­ evaporation capac. 
needed, ­ energy 
generation in the rec. 
boiler, ­ prod. Capacity 
3.3.16 Installation of scrubbers on the 
recovery boiler 
n.e. (­) n.e. ¯ n.e. (­/¯ ) energy balance 
3.3.17 Incineration of odorous gases in the 
recovery boiler 
¯ S make-up 
demand 
­ S excess 
­ handling 
system 
n.e. ¯ TRS n.e. ­ energy generation 
(burning with heat 
recovery) 
3.3.18 Incineration of odorous gases in the 
lime kiln 
¯ S make-up 
demand 
­ S excess 
­ handling 
system 
n.e. ¯ TRS n.e. (­ energy generation)  
3.3.19 Incineration of odorous gases in a 
separate furnace + scrubber 
¯ S make-up 
demand 
­ S excess 
­ handling 
system 
n.e. ¯ TRS 
(­ NOx) 
n.e. ­ energy generation 
(burning with heat 
recovery) 
3.3.20 Low NOx auxiliary boilers 
Low NOx burners in the lime kiln 
n.e. n.e. n.e. ¯NOx n.e. n.e. 





3.3.22 Low NOx recovery boiler by using 
Over Fire Air technique (OFA) 
n.e. n.e. n.e. ¯NOx n.e. n.e. 
3.3.23 Improved washing of lime mud n.e. n.e. n.e. ¯TRS n.e. n.e. 
3.3.24 ESP on bark boiler and lime kiln n.e. ­ electricity n.e. ¯ dust n.e. n.e. 
Notes: ­ = increase; ¯ = decrease; n.e. = no (or negligible) effect. (­/¯ ) = may or may not have an effect/little impact depending on the conditions; 
1) assumed that there is an efficient waste water treatment 
Table 3: Overview of available techniques in kraft pulping and their impact on the 
environment and the mill performance, respectively (Source: European 
Commission 2000:60) 
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One further example of an environmental innovation, namely a new recovery boiler 
technology, has not seen widespread recognition. The straw pulp mill in Fredericia, 
Denmark, had intended to solve its effluent discharge problems with this new 
technology. Despite the theoretically simple and straightforward approach the 
combustion process suffered from severe difficulties. The mill could not afford the 
redesign of the recovery boiler requiring unpredictable investment costs, and went 
bankrupt around 1995. 
Summing up, environmental innovations concerning pulp production from the 1970s 
onward primarily occurred in countries with comparatively stricter EP regulation and 
with a significant pulp and paper industry, i.e. particularly in Sweden and Finland for 
kraft pulping, and in Germany for sulfite pulping. Alternative ecologically favourable 
pulping processes (ASAM, Organocell, Formacell, Milox) were developed in Germany 
and Finland, too, up to the level of a demonstration or at least a pilot plant. These R&D 
efforts were largely due to related environmental regulations and substantial public 
funding. Diffusion of these environmental technologies occurred rather rapidly (within 
around one decade) in Western Europe, whereas they were adopted only slowly and 
partly in other major pulp producing countries, such as Canada, USA, Brazil, Russia, 
Japan, China, or Indonesia. For this reason ecologically sound pulp production - wi h 
still increasing production figures in spite of a gradually growing share of recovered pa-
per used - appears to become general practice on a global scale quite reluctantly only. 
4 The role of policy action 
Based on this overview over the evolution of environmental protection measures and 
successes in pulp production and the more detailed description of three cases in 
previous sections, the following ones serve to interpret thes  processes by addressing 
particularly the interplay of innovation and diffusion processes of new cooking and 
bleaching techniques, their interaction with environmental policy and technology policy 
development, and the actor and network configurations inv lved. The emphasis of this 
section is on the role of policy action and interpolicy coordination during major phases 
of development. Concerning pulp production, one may (in West Germany) reasonably 
distinguish the triggering-off phase of politically percived environmental problem 
pressure and of preparing environmental policy regulation in the early 1970s, the 
phase of elaborating and developing new concepts and techniques of environmental 
protection with a dominant role of ETP in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and the 
phase of environmental regulation and technology diffusion in the 1980s and, in a more 
relaxed and less confrontational manner, in the 1990s, too. 
4.1 Environmental problem pressure 
In the early 1970s environmental policy developed vigorously in West Germany. At that 
time an urgent task was clearly seen in overcoming major environmental damages by 
air and water pollution. One major source was water pollution by pulp production. 
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Particularly in cases, when drinking water was drawn from rivers wher  huge volumes 
of wastewater effluents were emitted by pulp mills located upstream, the problem 
pressure to reduce water pollution became urgent. 
As EP could not enforce directives in a way to guarantee water protection effectively 
the federal government i roduced the wastewater levy act (AbwAG) in 1974 providing 
economic incentives for industries to reduce their wastewater emissions by a levy 
collected per wastewater unit. An expert opinion (Rincke et al. 1975) discussed and 
demonstrated in detail economically viable modes of such a wastewater levy for the 
German pulp and paper industry, and considerably influenced its final stipulations. 
Whereas the paper industry - contrary to its own propaganda - could well afford 
biological treatment of its effluents wi hout being economically threatened, the burden 
for the pulp industry was considered so high that compensatory measures appeared 
necessary, especially because aerobic and anaerobic treatment stages become 
effective after the elimination of chlorine as a bleaching agent only. Such measures 
were exemptions in case of building wastewater treatment plants, as well as a longer 
transition period, and spending the wastewater levy for related water protection 
measures by corresponding public subsidies for the pulp industry, for instance for 
corresponding environmental R&D projects. Against strong resistance of (pulp and 
paper) industry, the AbwAG was passed in 1976; the wastewater levy was collected, 
however, only from 1981 onward with distinctly rising rates until 1986. In conjunction 
with setting standards for wastewaters according to the WHG in the AbwasserVwV 
described below, the implementation of the AbwAG, in particular by corresponding 
state ordinances, thus took place primarily in the 1980s.
In retrospect he pulp industry - in contrast to the paper industry - is one of few 
industries that was in fact strongly pushed by this act to develop and to change towards 
an ecologically sound pulp production. Thus, environmental policy regulations indeed 
prepared the ground for environmental innovations in pulp production during the 1970s 
and 1980s. 
4.2 New concepts and R&D projects 
The development of environmental technologies aiming at the management and reduc-
tion of environmental pollution by pulp production has been summarized in section 2.3 
already. The corresponding R&D projects were mostly well embedded in an overall 
technological regime of for about a century in several technological trajectories 
(continuously) ongoing development and improvement of pulping technologi s (see cf. 
Jaakko Pöyry 1997). Although these projects frequently experimented with new 
concepts in the design of pulping processes they were primarily incremental 
innovations insofar as they used and combined existing know-how of chemical 
engineering and processing technology in order to reduce or to avoid environmental 
pollution by modify ng and optimising pulping processes in already existing pulp mills, 
in particular. Thus, they were confronted with the typical trial-and-error settings and 
scaling-up problems of optimising complex technological systems on the basis of new 
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arrangements developed on a laboratory and pilot plant scale, as clearly illustrated in 
the case studies presented. Concerning new alternative pulping processes and the 
closure of the pulping process, by implementing an effective process for the recovery of 
all inorganic pulping chemicals, they cannot be classified as just incremental 
innovations only, even though the ASAM process, for instance, is mainly the intelligent 
combination of several known pulping techniques.  
Altogether a development trend towards a more comprehensive perspective of pulp 
and paper production and their related environmental problems can be discerned in the 
direction and design of these environmental R&D projects, for instance by changing 
from wastewater treatment to the avoidance of chlorine bleaching, to the recovery of 
chemicals and energy, and to closed systems of the pulping process, though such a 
comprehensive perspective was in principle already develop d in the 1970s. 
In view of rising public and political concern about environmental pollution ETP was 
quite open and willing to fund and thereby push corresponding environmental 
technologies as can seen from the manifold environmental R&D projects addressing 
pulp production which were (partly) funded by the BMFT and promoted and 
administered by the research project management bodies DLR and PTWT during the 
1970s and 1980s. Thus, when this favourable orientation of technology policy met with 
interested and competent actors in science and industry affiliated with pulp production, 
promising R&D projects were launched and carried out in scientific institutes and pulp 
mills. This setting favoured experimentation with various concepts and arrangements of 
relevant environmental technologies, but did not systematically preclude questionable 
technological ideas and project objectives, for it was not based on a substantive overall 
ETP concept. Because there undoubtedly exist quite different technological options to 
limit wastewater load, namely external purification of the effluent, after-treatment of 
incurring waste, or closed cycles of pulping processes, and because the environmental 
impacts of different pulping processes depend on the specific modes of their technical 
realization and not just on their basic (chemical) features72, such a policy approach of 
ETP appears well justifiable, even if EP (correctly) evaluated some projects as futile. 
Furthermore, however, as long as corresponding (pending) mandatory environme tal 
regulations and standards were missing, little diffusion of such newly developed 
environmental technologies occurred because they were typically associated with 
additional costs of pulp production and required considerable investments in altering 
the few existing (old) pulp mills in West Germany. Thus, this diffusion process which 
was necessary to effectively reduce environmental pollution by pulp mills strongly 
depended on regulatory and economic incentives for the pulp industry provided by 
corresponding EP regulations, namely the AbwAG and the AbwasserVwV becoming 
effective during the 1980s. Significantly, the chlorine-free bleaching process developed 
in the Alfeld pulp mill73 proved to be the (politically intended) state-of-th -art 
                                         
72 The environmental compatibility of the modified kraft process, applied in the Blankenstein pulp mill, 
demonstrates this, as opposed to the traditional kraft process. 
73 As pointed out in section 3.4 it was funded directly by UBA within the investment program of the 
BMI/BMU and indirectly by reductions of the wastewater levy made possible by the AbwAG. 
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environmental technology, which was taken over by all German sulfite pulp mills after 
1990, if not shut down for economic reasons in view of the 1989 amendment of the 
AbwasserVwV annex 19. 
Further environmental R&D projects were still carried out since the 1990s, but direct
involvement of public policy by funding clearly declined, except for the special case of 
reconstructing the Blankenstein pulp mill. Although pressure by EP on the pulp and 
paper industry to apply best available technologies continued (AbwV annex 19 
amendment, probably issued in 2000, BREF for pulp and paper production; European 
Commission 2000), currently further environmental innovations will tend to be mainly 
determined by economic interests and considerations of the major (non-German) 
corporations in the pulp and paper industry which dominate the world market. 
4.3 Environmental regulation and technology diffusion 
Based on the overview given in previous sections, in the following the political 
bargaining processes resulting in the environmental regulations which paved the way 
for the diffusion of environmental innovations mentioned are described in somewhat 
more detail for the various (amended) annexes 19 of the administrative regulation on 
wastewater. 
After the AbwAG was passed in 1976 a working group consisting of representatives of 
federal and state environmental ministries and subordinate agencies as well as of the 
pulp and paper industry developed through intense and controversial bargaining 
processes AbwasserVwV annex 19 from 1977 to 1980.74 Formally issued in 1982 this 
annex for the first time set various standards for wastewater of pulp and paper 
production concerning wastewater volumes, wastewater substances, chemical and 
biochemical oxygen demand and fish toxicity. Permissible levels of AOX emission were 
not yet debated and only added in the first amendment issued in 1989 though chlorine-
free bleaching techniques were mentioned as the state of the art in the annotations to 
the annex, which address the administration implementing it, and therefore as 
measures to be performed. From 1986 to 1989 a similar working group negotiated this 
first amendment, though without representatives of industry because they had tended 
to block any progress in the first working group. The 1989 amendment to 
AbwasserVwV annex 19A, addressing pulp production only, reduced the old standards 
considerably, for example to 70 kg/t COD, and fixed an AOX standard of 1 kg per ton 
pulp produced from 1990 onwards.75 From 1997 to 2000, again a similar working group 
developed the AbwV annex 19 part I, which replaced the 1989 amendment, probably in 
                                         
74 An initiative by the European Commission to issue a corresponding wastewater directive petered out 
because of severe scepticism of member countries. 
75 Since this AOX standard became effective for high viscose pulp in 1993 only because of the strong 
lobbying of governmental representatives and of the pulp industry from Bavaria the nickname of this 
annex is lex Kelheim. The high viscosity sulfite dissolving pulp grades, produced by the Kelheim mill, 
required C-bleaching. As a consequence, the Kelheim mill was forced to look for other pulp grades to 
be sold on the market. Ironically, just this pulp mill developed the high consistency, high temperature 
oxygen delignification that could not be applied for the high viscosity pulp grades produced, because 
these oxygen bleaching stage conditions destroyed the viscosity. 
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late 2000, and resulted in further reduction of pulp related standards, namely COD to 
25 kg/t and AOX to 0 for sulfite pulp and to 0,25 kg/t for kraft pulp, and in additional 
limit values for phosphorus and nitrogen. Furthermore, requirements to minimise waste 
residues as far as feasible under given circumstances by appropriate techniques are 
listed, for instance chemicals recovery, closed cooking cycles, chlorine-free bl aching, 
or minimisation and retention of organic chelating agents. 
About the same time the European IPPC Bureau negotiated the BREF note on BAT in 
the pulp and paper industry (European Commission 2000) that was passed in 2000. 
This detailed BREF (ca. 500 pages), a hybrid of a compulsory and persuasive policy 
instrument, is of political significance because according to the IPPC directive 
(96/61/EC) it has to be taken into account in public licensing procedures. As a 
consequence, strong lobbying by affected industries, intense efforts of information 
gathering on BAT, and bargaining between different national actors take place around 
the elaboration of a BREF note. 
In the political bargaining processes around AbwasserVwV annex 19 in the late 1970s 
and again in the 1980s the pulp industry fiercely declared the technical and/or 
economic unfeasibility of environmental protection measures in order to fulfill the 
standards envisaged for wastewater effluents, such as COD and AOX limit values. The 
counter strategy of (federal) EP was to demonstrate he technical viability of 
corresponding environmental protection measures that would then allow to fix effective 
standards and to stimulate the pulp industry to introduce them because of the (rising) 
wastewater levy. For this purpose, information was not only gathered through 
inspection of German pulp mills, but also from foreign environmental protection efforts, 
particularly in Sweden. Because EP could in principle set certain environmental 
standards and fund the development of end-of-pipe technologies of wastewater 
treatment, but not tell industry which processing technology to develop and to apply in 
order to meet these standards, UBA convinced the BMU to also use funds of its 
investment program, that aimed primarily at the development of air pollution prevention 
technologies, for R&D projects demonstrating the viability of certain technologies to 
avoid water pollution by pulp production. The development of EOP bleaching at the 
Alfeld and Ehingen mills and of combined aerobic and anaerobic wastewater 
purification and - unsuccessfully - of chemicals recovery and distillation by pyrolysis at 
the Ehingen mill were the major projects resulting from this strategy. These 
demonstration projects proved to be more successful than the R&D projects funded by 
the BMFT, for their results were taken over by other pulp mills, subsequently. 
Despite their interest in safe drinking water extraction the representatives of those 
states (Länder) with pulp mills, such as Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg, opposed 
(strict) environmental standards because of the strongly perceived risks of (local) eco-
nomic decline and loss of employment following increased production costs and even-
tual shut-down of "their" pulp mills. Whereas the BMU and UBA got information from 
Degussa, which was certainly interested in the substitution of chlorine bleaching by 
peroxide bleaching, about the feasibility of peroxide bleaching, and whereas the pulp 
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and paper industry (quietly) prepared for a change to TCF bleaching76 given the per-
ceived unavoidability of - publicly still strongly opposed - future AOX standards,77 some 
state governments still tried to forgo (stricter) environmental limit values and felt 
ashamed after these new standards were met in pulp mills by obviously well viable en-
vironmental technologies. 
The establishment of the standards was to a large extent possible only because few 
key persons in the BMU and UBA persistently pursued this objective and - backed by 
public concern and some representatives of public authorities involved - stood the 
enormous pressure exerted by opposing actors.78 They also succeeded in setting the 
standards because these were not very demanding any longer - even if quite strict by 
international comparison - when becoming effective (e.g. no AOX standard in the 
AbwasserVwV annex 19 issued in 1982, only 1 and not 0,5 kg/t AOX in the amended 
annex 19 issued in 1989), for the pulp industry was well able to fulfill stricter limit 
values with techniques already available contrary to its own public statements. 
Because pulp mills indeed reduced their emissions more than legally required when 
retrofitting their installations, this approach of imposing not tough limit values can be 
defended against plausible criticism by environmentalists as perhaps being more 
effective than a more rigorous regulatory approach. Thus, it may well have led to 
similar actual wastewater emissions and helped learning processes and more 
cooperative attitudes to evolve in the pulp industry. Very rigorous standards, however, 
might well have suffered severe implementation deficits when the AbwasserVwV annex 
19 was to be actually put into force by state and local administration. 
Whereas the 1982 AbwasserVwV annex 19 was essentially the result of the negotiation 
processes indicated above in conjunction with the economic effectiveness of the 
AbwAG, the change to TCF bleaching by the pulp industry was not only due to the 
1989 amendment to AbwasserVwV annex 19 but at least as much to market forces. 
These originated from publishers, in particular, who started to demand chlorine-free 
paper since 1991 because they were confronted with public debate and protest 
addressing chlorine and possible dioxin risks of pulp and paper, which was organised 
by Greenpeace, in particular. 
Rather by chance Greenpeace came across high loads of chlorinated compounds 
discharged into river waters in 1985, when travelling up the Rhine river. Then, in 
searching for alternatives and in learning by doing (study of crucial documents, 
chlorine-free paper products produced in Sweden) it launched a campaign in favour of 
chlorine-free paper around 1990. Advocating a similar brightness quality of paper 
                                         
76 These preparations and corresponding investments explain why all West German pulp mills - if not 
shut down - were able to change to TCF bleaching so quickly in 1990/91. 
77 AOX are admittedly hazardous for human health and difficult to extract from drinking water. And the 
pulp and paper industry contributed more than 50% to the AOX load of, for instance, the Rhine river 
in the 1980s. 
78 As an anecdote it should be mentioned in this context that even the former minister of interior, 
Zimmermann, fiercely resisted the former prime minister of Bavaria, Strauß, despite the fact that the 
latter was the party leader of the (Bavarian) CSU to which the former belonged, too. 
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produced by chlorine-free bleached pulp,79 pulling off the coup of a chlorine-fre  copy 
of the well-known magazine "Der Spiegel" in 1991,80 that received enormous publicity, 
and organising protest postcards of readers to publishers, Greenpeace mobilised 
sufficient public pressure so that many publishers gradually switched to chlorine-free 
books, magazines and other print products in order to avoid public protest.81 To 
emphasize the role of Greenpeace in the "greening" of the German pulp and paper 
industry82 does not imply, however, that this NGO, and not the BMU and UBA, was the 
key actor in this process. Whereas this may well be true for some chemicals, as the 
stop of dumping diluted acid in the North Sea (cf. Ditz 1989, Ökopol 1999), 
Greenpeace started its campaign for chlorine-free paper only lately, and the options of 
EP to enforce ecological limit values were more developed than those of Greenpeace, 
even if they were less strict than feasible on technical grounds. 
With the change to TCF bleaching scientific representatives of German pulp producers 
already in 1990 defended the AOX limit value (for sulfite pulping) on (international) 
symposia where for example Canadian pulp producers lobbied for renewed admission 
of chlorine bleaching. With Germany being a rather large pulp (and paper) market and 
with German paper producers dominating the German pulp and paper industry (mostly 
integrated production, more than 80% of chemical pulp imported) they were in the 
comfortable position of exerting pressure to get at least ECF pulp for its considerable 
amounts of pulp imported. Furthermore, together with the decreasing importance of 
pulp production issues for the pulp and paper industry, learning processes and 
changes in attitude took place leading to the voluntary declaration of the pulp and 
paper industry and publishers mentioned above (VDZ/VDP 1996) stating their 
commitment to do their best for ecological care in forestry, pulp and paper production, 
paper recycling and printing. Even though this declaration may well be classified only 
as symbolic policy, it reflects corresponding learning processes and reorientations as 
well as actual changes towards an ecologically more sound pulp and paper production. 
Thus, in spite of still ongoing resistance and lobbying against further substantial 
environmental regulations of pulp and paper production, for instance via the recent 
BREF note, the wastewater ordinance annex 19 part I, to be issued in late 2000, was 
developed within a rather consensual approach. There was agreement on the 
technologies to be applied, for instance TCF bleaching, multi-step biological 
                                         
79 Only for high quality products requiring an extraordinary degree of brightness chlorine dioxide is still 
needed in the bleaching process. Concerning brightness of paper, it is important to note the trade-off 
between stronger bleaching and fibre quality. 
80 To get this "Anti-Spiegel" printed required quite a clever strategy of Greenpeace in order to find a 
paper producer and a printer for this purpose. If the paper producer would have known the objective, 
he would not have supplied the chlorine-f ee paper required, and the printer did not stop to print this 
special magazine only because of considerable recovery claims voiced by Greenpeace. 
81 In retrospect a Greenpeace representative judged the shift of the organisation's activity focus to forest 
protection and ecological forestry in 1992 as too early because TCF bleaching was not introduced on 
a global scale, and even ECF bleaching though connected with much lower chlorine emissions did not 
yet develop to the dominant bleaching mode in kraft pulping. Furthermore, customers seem to be no 
longer willing to pay a higher price for chlorine-free paper products. 
82 Similar observations were made by Kisser/Kirschten (1995) for Austria. Typically, Greenpeace played 
a major role in pushing ECF and TCF bleaching in many industrialised and developing countries 
(Sonnenfeld 2000). 
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wastewater purification, chemicals recovery, and the main issues con erned the size of 
the wastewater levy and the necessary extent of further environmental improvements. 
Through ample communication with all of the 6 and now 5 pulp mill companies left, the 
pulp industry was indirectly, but clearly involved in the drafting p ocess of AbwV annex 
19 part I by the administrative working group. Significant delays in finalising this new 
annex 19 were not caused by opposition of the pulp industry but by formal bureaucratic 
misunderstandings among the responible public actors involved, concerning for 
example the definition of measurement procedures, or the formulation relating to 
chelating agents.83 
Having succeeded in limiting and strongly reducing wastewater load of pulp production 
by to a large degree integrated environmental tchnologies and being provided with the 
in ecological terms most advanced sulfite pulp mills in the EU,84 on the one hand, Ger-
man environmental policy currently (understandably) is less keen on further substantial 
environmental improvements and shows more appreciation of the pulp industry's con-
cerns. On the other hand, the pulp and paper industry meanwhile accepts reasonable 
demands for environmental protection and even introduces environmental management 
systems and ecoaccounts (cf. Sixta 1995). Thus, it is no wonder that the German pulp 
and paper industry for the time being is coming along with EP and that further environ-
mental innovations are no longer primarily made in Germany, but elsewhere. 
In retrospect, the conclusion appears well justified that EP and ETP together were 
crucial factors to effect via environmental regulation (environmental standards and 
levies) and promotion of technology development both environmental innovations and 
their diffusion in German pulp production facilities. Without these policy measures they 
would have been developed at best much later induced by external market demand, as 
can be seen from other countries, where EP and ETP did not play a significant role. 
However, in the last resort economic viability and the technological trajectory prevailing 
in pulp processing were decisive for the success of few specific technological options, 
as demonstrated by the failure of (new) alternative pulping processes in particular.
Concerning environmental innovation, public funding of R&D projects by the 
BMFT/BMBF or by the BMU and, indirectly, by reduction of the wastewater levy (i.e. 
ETP) was in most cases a necessary condition, whereas (pending) environmental 
regulation (i.e. EP) put pressure on the pulp and paper industry to become intrest d in 
such R&D projects. Concerning diffusion of these environmental innovations, environ-
mental regulation was a necessary condition, whereas usually ETP had no legal 
competence and also consciously saw no reason for further public funding in this 
respect, once the techniques to fulfill EP requirements had been developed. 
Interpolicy coordination between EP and ETP was well prevalent in the 1970s and 
1980s, as self-evident mutual regard of relevant policies, partly as conscious coordina-
                                         
83 Interestingly, the need of chelating agents such as EDTA to prevent eroxide decomposition by heavy 
metals in P-bleaching leads to a trade-off between the latter and D-bleaching because EP aims at the 
prevention of both, chlorine and EDTA to be released into wastewater effluents, though the 
environmental and health hazards of AOX are much larger than of EDTA. 
84 Only Austrian pulp mills show a similarly advanced environmental performance. 
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tion of policy programs, and occasionally as conscious coordination of specific 
projects.85 
It occurred, first of all, as internal ETP coordination, where the responsible research 
project management bodies DLR and PTWT, and - though with diminishing funds - 
UBA, had to agree on their mutual domains ((integrated) environmental technology 
within the pulping process; wastewater treatment; waste treatment) and to exchange 
relevant information with each other, with the responsible (federal) ministries BMFT 
and BMU, and also with state ministries responsible for a specific pulp mill involved in a 
R&D project. Although formally subordinate to the BMU and thus belonging to EP, UBA 
(as a research project management body) functionally relates to ETP insofar as it 
gathers environmentally relevant scientific and technical information and funds R&D 
projects. Furthermore, the obligatory early departmental coordination ensured 
agreement of different federal ministries to an R&D project. Certainly, there existed 
friction and controversy betw en ETP (and EP) actors, which were debated in the 
expert meetings deciding about and evaluating ongoing R&D projects. Thus, EP actors 
were well sceptical about the viability of some R&D projects funded by the BMFT. 
Genuine EP/ETP interpolicy coordination primarily took place in the working group(s), 
headed by the BMU, charged to develop AbwasserVwV annex 19. Here the feasibility 
of certain standards according to available technical options and their further 
development was debated, involving - beyond (local) economic and employment 
concerns - (indirect) arguments in both directions: public funding of environmental 
technology development allowing more rigorous standards, as well as setting stricter 
limit values inducing further technology development, possibly supported by public 
funding. Beyond mutual regard of EP and ETP this proceeding clearly involves 
elements of a conscious coordination of policy programs, too. 
As far as the funding by UBA of specific development and demonstration projects at 
Alfeld and Ehingen in the 1980s is concerned, which should demonstrate the technical 
feasibility of certain bleaching and waste treatment technologies so that the 
environmental standards envisaged in AbwasserVwV annex 19 could be met, one may 
well interpret this stra egy as conscious EP/ETP coordination of specific projects. 
Altogether, coordination of EP and ETP, that in general is often observed at a low level 
only, occurred and was successful to quite some degree concerning environmental 
protection in pulp production. Certainly, some positive funding decisions by the BMFT 
lacked technical competence and could have been avoided if other (administrative) 
bodies such as UBA had been consulted more extensively, and environmental 
standards could have been stricter than those introduced if more knowledge about 
already available technological options had been obtainable. However, a higher degree 
of EP/ETP interpolicy coordination was unlikely to result in more effective 
environmental protection measures than the ones achived. 
                                         
85 See Conrad (2000a) for a more detailed elaboration of the concept of interpolicy coordination. 
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4.4 The need for a long-term perspective 
This section places the outcomes of pulp-related German EP and ETP in a wider 
context and evaluates them correspondingly. 
First, the viability of pulp-related environmental (technology) policy objectives was and 
is strongly influenced by the following factors: 
– fierce (international) competition in a still growing market,
– typical price cycles lasting 4 to 8 years, 
– acquisition of German pulp mills by large foreign paper corporations, 
– high share of imported (chemical) pu p (over 80%), 
– displacement of market pulp by integrated pulp and paper production during the 
1970s and 1980s, 
– special situation of exclusive sulfite pulping in West Germany, contrasting dominant 
kraft pulping on the world market, 
– successful development of modified kraft pulping in Scandinavia leading to its 
licensing during the reconstruction of the Blankenstein pulp mill supported by huge 
public subsidies, 
– great and still growing share of waste paper (ca. 60%) in paper production. 
The strong price competition, in conjunction with high imports of partly advantageous 
kraft pulp and with cheap recovered paper, impedes costly (sulfite) pulp production due 
to environmental protection measures. Furthermore, major markets such as Canada, 
USA, or Brazil showed little interest in TCF pulp. 
The mutual reinforcement of quasi-per odic pulp and paper price cycles also works 
counter passing on additional environmental costs because newly erected pulp mills 
lead to an only discontinuous capacity increase and demand is very price sensitive. 
This effect was particularly visible in case of declining market prices around 1970-73, 
1977-78, 1983-85, 1992-93 and 1995-96, possibly accentuated further by the 
prevailing price fixing in US dollars. One may even suspect a tendency to lower market 
prices due to (obvious) competitive moves of established pulp producers when a new 
ecologically advanced pulp mill will supply the market with additional pulp. 
Within the ongoing globalisation and concentration process in pulp and paper 
production, partly induced by the enormous investment costs needed for building new 
competitive pulp mills, the purchase of German pulp mills because of competitive 
strategies of foreign pulp producers gives them enlarged bargaining power vis-à-vis 
unpleasant environmental regulations. Currently, the remaining big German pulp mills 
are owned by Sappi (Alfeld and Ehingen, since 1992), SCA86 (Mannheim since 1995), 
MoDo (Stockstadt since 1995), Mercer87 (Blankenstein, since 1994), and till 1999 
Stora, itself merged with Enso in 1998 (Baienfurt, since 1991).88 
                                         
86 Interestingly, owing several sulfite pulp mills, SCA tends to show the relatively strongest interest in 
environmental protection efforts compared to other large pulp producers. 
87 Mercer International Inc. is an investor group, formally situated at Zürich/Switzerland, based in 
Canada, formerly also including a South Korean shareholder, which is not a genuine pulp and paper 
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Integrated paper production allows mutual coordination of pulp and paper production 
processes and implies somewhat more independence from pulp price fluctuations, 
which is in principle favourable for the developm nt and/or adoption of environmental 
technologies. Further support in this direction comes from the greater strength of 
(economic) interests of the paper industry as opposed to those of the pulp industry, 
both represented by the VDP. This mainly results from the weak domestic basis of pulp 
production, the greater economic value added in paper production compared to pulp 
production, and the preponderance of integrated production. As a consequence, the 
concern of the paper industry to supply for instance chlorine-free paper to publishers 
and other customers is more important than the concern for additional environmental 
costs of pulp production. 
Within Germany, the predominance of sulfite pulping for understandable reasons 
allowed to focus on R&D projects and environmental standards oriented towards 
environmental improvements within this pulping process although the development of 
alternative pulping options was funded, too. After successful development of the 
modified kraft process in Scandinavia, however, EP no longer had sound 
environmental reasons for licensing kraft pulping and ECF bleaching in the 
Blankenstein pulp mill in 1999 after the complete reconstruction of the old sulfite pulp 
mill. 
The large share of waste paper in paper production, consciously pr moted by EP, and 
the costs of recovered paper processing certainly influence the pulp market. However, 
for pragmatic reasons no substantial overall policy strategy or even program exists that 
consciously tries to mutually harmonize the amounts of pulp and recovered paper 
produced according to ecological criteria, though their relative distribution by the 
market will not tend to include them automatically. 
Altogether, these factors allow some scope for EP and ETP, however, under relatively 
stringent economic constraints. Thus, the national introduction of TCF bleaching, far-
going closure of the bleach plant, and biological wastewater treatment induced some 
extension of related technologies into other countries, though mostly restricted to the 
less important sulfite process, but did not lead to their global diffusion. Instead, for 
instance ECF bleaching experienced considerable diffusion on a global scale. In 
addition, because of the high share of imported pulp in Germany a considerable 
amount of paper sold still stems from pulp produced without these environmental 
techniques. And the strong and long-term funding of alternative pulping processes did 
even not result in their application in (new) pulp mills in Germany either because of 
their lacking economic viability (Organocell) or because of the inertia of prevailing 
technological trajectories (e.g. modified kraft pulp) and the risk averse attitude of 
potential (foreign) investors (ASAM). 
                                                                                                                              
producer, but only looks for profitable investment opportunities. Up to the present, it did not yet 
succeed in reselling the Blankenstein pulp mill despite some interest of a Finnish pulp producer. 
88 It can be stated that the main interest of these acquisitions was in strengthening the buyer's position in 
the world's fourth largest paper market, whereas the pulp mills provided some additional incentive 
because they could be kept in operation, after their main environmental problems had been solved 
and production was economical since the 1990s. 
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As long as the political system does not dispose of capacities89 to develop 
(economically viable) complex technical systems such as an ecologically sound pulping 
process on its own, it can only try to induce the development of corresponding 
environmental technologies by appropriate policy strategies and instruments. Taking 
into account the typical egotisms and eigendynamic90 of and the related frictions 
between different policy areas and political organisations such as ministries and 
agencies, and being aware of the failure of many R&D projects funded, one can say 
that German ETP and EP may well be judged to have indeed used their scope of action 
to induce environmental innovations (and their subsequent diffusion), concerning both 
established and new cooking, bleaching, and waste management processes. Whereas 
alternative pulping processes failed to penetrate the market, the ecologically oriented 
alteration of the sulfite process in the 1980s (as well as the adaptive innovation of the 
modified kraft process in the 1990s) took place to a large degree in all German pulp 
mills leading to enormous reduction of pollutants in their wastewater effluents. 
Concerning time horizons of an effective ETP, it has to take into account both the 
necessary periods of time required by various development processes and their timely 
positive interplay. Time is needed for 
1. successful commercial upscaling of environmental innovations beyond R&D 
projects that proved to be technically viable in laboratory, pilot and demonstration 
plants, 
2. the diffusion of new technological arrangements by adaptive innovations of o her 
pulp producers, 
3. the erection of a new pulp mill, where to incorporate environmental technologies, 
4. the eventual (social and technical) installation of a new technological trajectory 
(e.g. alternative pulping processes); 
5. the political negotiation and acceptance of related environmental regulations and 
standards, including the coordination of different levels (federal, state, supra-
national (EU)) and fields (technology, economic, environmental, fiscal policy) of 
politics, 
6. the actual implementation of these regulations and standards, 
7. effects of postponement caused by possibly low market prices for pulp, lacking 
financial resources, the dependence of building new pulp mills on the phasing out 
of old ones, and the change in ownership of a pulp mill. 
This list clearly demonstrates that routine adoption of environmental innovations in pulp 
processing typically requires at least one or two decades and cannot be accelerated 
significantly, and thus the need for a long-term perspective of effective ETP. And the 
list also indicates that without the timely positive interplay of corresponding social 
processes, where the key actors in corporations, public authorities or R&D institutions 
                                         
89 The prominent example in this respect is the public ownership of an industry, which is frequently 
connected, however, with doubtful economic and political impacts. 
78 This term means to the (social) dynamics induced by the vested interests, sunk costs, and inertia of a 
system, institution, or group, once it has become firmly established and developed its own 
momentum. 
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realise the window of opportunity, the (policy-induced) adoption of environmental 
innovations becomes blocked by lack of concurrence of economic, sociocultural, 
regulatory and other provisions or at least occurs later (cf. Edquist 1997, 
Hemmelskamp 1999, Hemmelskamp et al. 2000, Klemmer 1999), as can be illustrated 
by the examples of Spain or the USA (Blazejczak/Edler 1999). 
Summing up, EP and ETP played a crucial role in Germany in triggering the innovation 
and diffusion of environmental technologies in pulp production during the 1970s and 
1980s, in particular. Economic incentives, in particular, provided by the AbwAG and by 
public co-funding, induced considerable R&D efforts of the pulp industry, and 
technologically not excessively demanding environmental standards and regulations 
pushed the diffusion of technically and economically viable environmental innovations. 
These policy stimuli of innovation and diffusion processes were supported by 
corresponding market forces due to the demand of publishers for chlorine-free paper. 
This demand was sparked by public pressure initiated by a Greenpeac  campaign. The 
shift in policy support from end-of-pipe oriented wastewater treatment to integrated 
technologies saving water and energy, recovering chemicals, substituting chlorine 
bleaching, and closing processing cycles in pulp production as well as th  patience and 
persistence of EP in spite of partial change of responsible persons deserves 
recognition. Similarly, the far-reaching reduction of public funding of pulp-related R&D 
projects in the 1990s parallel to ongoing EP pressure on the pulp industry to attain the 
rather complete closure of all pulp processing cycles as far as economically viable 
appears justifiable, after major objectives of environmental protection in pulp production 
by appropriate techniques had been achieved. 
In spite of this rather positive evaluation of EP and ETP, however, at best the partial 
and slow diffusion of environmental innovations observed in pulp production at the 
global level could be expected under given socioeconomic conditions and reasonable 
social science assumptions. 
5 Actors and networks 
This section presents the actor constellation concerning environmental innovations in 
pulp production at the general as well as the case specific level, inquires into the 
interests, perceptions and strategies of the actors involved, and indicates the pattern 
and impact of related actor networks. 
The actors involved in the cases investigated can be defined at two levels: 
organisations and individuals. Because the various individuals in principle acted 
according to the rules and iterests of their organisational units, on the one hand, and 
because key persons and, possibly, personal conflicting issues within organisational 
units played a crucial role for the specific development path of a case history, on the 
other hand, it appears appropriate to pragmatically analyse actor behaviour and 
constellation at the levels of organisational units and of key individuals, without striving 
for a theoretically coherent concept of actor constellations. Although frequently 
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organisational sub-units within a macro- rganisation such as the BMBF are the true 
organisational actors, with typically around 5 to 20 individuals belonging to these sub-
units, it is in this context often satisfactory to nominally conceive of macro-
organisations as essential actors. 
Similarly, the network concept is applied only at a phenomenological level in this study, 
without going into its theoretical differentiations (see cf. Hellmer et al. 1999, Kowol 
1998, Sydow/Windeler 2000), when addressing networks around environmental 
innovations, although regulatory, business and knowledge networks are distinguished 
for this purpose, which typically follow different tasks and consist of different actors 
(van Dijken et al. 1999). 
At the general level, the macro-actors to be denominated are environmental, 
technology policy, and economic ministries, pulp and paper corporations and their 
associations, suppliers and customers of pulp production units, scientific research 
institutions and possibly environmental organisations such as Greenpeac . More 
concretely, the general actor constellation consisted of 
– the responsible units of the BMU and UBA, and of the BMFT/BMBF,  
– the research project management bodies DLR and PTWT, 
– the environmental and economic state ministries concerned, 
– the companies operating German pulp mills, 
– the (foreign) (pulp and paper) corporations owning these companies, 
– the VDP, 
– the companies supplying the equipment for the pulp mills, in particular Degussa 
providing peroxide for P-bleaching, 
– the customers of pulp and paper roducts such as publishers, 
– academic and corporate research units involved in pulp-related R&D projects, 
– Greenpeace, 
– and, primarily at the local level, regional and communal administrative units 
implementing environmental regulations in pulp mills or affected by related polluting 
emissions. 
The interests, strategies and perceptions of these actors have already been described 
in previous sections. To sum up, all actors largely proceeded according to their 
interests, problem perceptions and strategic orientations, frequently connected with a 
clever use of existing economic and political framework conditions. On the basis of a 
common, at least partial acknowledgement of the social need to limit and to reduce 
environmental pollution by pulp production, a negotiation process balancing the 
controversial actor interests was feasible that led, within 2 and more decades, to 
increasingly rigorous environmental standards and regulations. The corresponding 
compromises could be reached because all parties involved in thenegotiation 
processes had significant bargaining power so that no actor was able to impose its 
position completely. 
EP was strong enough to pass effective, but not excessively strict environmental regu-
lations; the VDP could threaten to (have to) shut down pulp mills if these regulations 
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were too rigorous or introduced too rapidly introduced environmental regulations; the 
state ministries could have their necessary agreement (to pass water regulations) 
depend on the inclusion of smooth transitional rules and temporary exceptions; ETP 
could - under these circumstances - induce the development of environmental tech-
nologies by (partly) funding it, particularly if combined with the legally foreseen 
reduction of the wastewater levy to be paid; suppliers of envir nmental protection facili-
ties could demonstrate the technical feasibility to fulfill certain environmental standards; 
publishers could demand chlorine-free paper; and Greenpeace could transform public 
environmental concern into (economic) pressure upon key actors such as publishers. 
Furthermore, the gradual (environmental) learning process induced by the negotiation 
processes91, the growing priority of paper issues over pulp issues in the German pulp 
and paper industry, the actual implementation of environmental protection technologies 
demonstrating their viability to their adversaries, and the effective reduction of environ-
mental pollution in pulp production together have been gradually leading to a softening 
of controversial interests because of decreasing pressure caused by ecological 
problems and more similar problem perceptions and solution strategies of the actors, at 
least since the 1990s. Their basic tenets can be enumerated as follows: environmental 
pollution by pulp production can be and meanwhile has been limited to an acceptable 
level; corresponding development of environmental technologies should be funded by 
public resources to a large extent; therefore related environmental regulations (slowly) 
were considered acceptable; their economic impacts do not undermine competitiveness 
of integrated paper production, at least within Germany; German pulp mills meanwhile 
are among the ecologically most advanced ones by international comparison. Thus, the 
environmental protection measures actually introduced certainly were not the optimal 
ones that could have been achieved in most cases, but all (macro-)acto s evaluated the 
arrangements reached as at least acceptable, if not satisfactory for their purposes in 
ecological, economic or political terms. 
Concerning environmental R&D projects, all participating actors were more or less in 
favour of them, particularly if supported by public funding; criticism mainly came from 
competing pulp companies, although nearly all of them received public funds to 
conduct such a R&D project. Despite the eigendynamic typically induced by project 
commitment it should be noted, however, that, apart from R&D projects addressing 
alternative pulping processes, the dominant objective tended to remain one of 
successful (innovative) performance of a well specified project of applying, integrating 
and optimising available technological concepts and not one of a far reaching 
environmental innovation. This illustrates the significant momentum (and inertia) 
resulting from an established technological trajectory, conceivable in the sphere of 
sulfite pulping. 
At the case study level of specific environmental technology development the following 
actors are to be listed (see section 3): 
                                         
91 At least to some degree, they required valid technical arguments to defend one's bargaining position. 
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Ehingen, peroxide bleaching: Schwäbische Zellstoff AG, Degussa, Kamyr (Swedish 
producer of a high shear mixer); BMFT, DLR, regional water authority Tübingen, water 
supply corporation Landeswasserversorgung Baden-Württemberg; key person: 
responsible managing director of the pulp mill. 
Ehingen, biological wastewater treatment and pyrolysis: Schwäbische Zellstoff AG, 
producers of the pyrolysis plant and of the biological purification plant; UBA, BMU, TÜV 
Südwest, Stuttgart university. 
Baienfurt, wastewater purification: Feldmühle AG, pulp and cardboard factory Baienfu t, 
DVGW research unit; BMFT, PTWT, regional water authority. 
Baienfurt, ASAM process: institute for wood technology at Hamburg university, 
Kraftanlagen Heidelberg, Asam Technologie GmbH, Feldmühle AG, pulp and 
cardboard factory Baienfurt, Austrian Energy & Environment, Voest-Alpine, Impco-
Voest-Alpine, Ingersoll-Rand, Beloit, Landecker, Stora, SCA, Sappi; BMFT, DLR, BMU, 
state ministry of environment of Baden-Württemberg, EU Commission; key persons: 
main inventor of the ASAM process, responsible managing director of the pilot plant. 
Kelheim, high pressure oxygen bleaching: PWA, Bayerische Zellstoff AG, various 
suppliers of installations, mixed project group with external cooperating institutes; 
BMFT, PTWT, Bavarian and communal licensing authorities. 
Kelheim, Organocell process: MD-Verwaltungsgesellschaft, MD-Papierfabriken, 
Technocell AG, Organocell GmbH, Organocell Thyssen GmbH, Bayerische Zellstoff 
AG, external engineering office, Munich university, technical university of Munich, other 
universities, Burda, PWA, Thyssen Rheinstahl Technik, suppliers of pulp-related 
plants: Kamyr, Steinmüller; BMFT, DLR, Bavarian government, Bavarian and 
communal licensing authorities, group of credit granting banks, Donaupark GmbH, EU 
Commission, Jaakko Pöyry; key person : Nicolaus (co- wner of MD-Papierfabriken), 
project leader and managing director of Bayerische Zellstoff AG and Organocell GmbH, 
managing director of Organocell Thyssen GmbH and Organocell GmbH, managing 
director of Technocell AG. 
These actor constellations indicate three typical features: 
1. Only a few actors were substantially involved in the R&D projects, namely the 
project participants of the pulp mill, between 5 and 20 persons; sometimes 
cooperating academic research groups; and, to a varying degree of collaboration, 
equipment and chemicals suppliers, Degussa in particular. The other actors were 
related to the R&D project essentially either because of (partial) ownership of the 
pulp mill or technology, or because of environmental regulation or public project 
funding. They largely took the role of enabling and controlling the R&D projects by 
providing and limiting (financial) resources and by assessing project-relat d 
environmental improvements, but hardly intervened in them by substantive 
contributions. 
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2. Whereas the number of actors involved was rather limited for the bleaching and 
purification technologies developed, it was considerable for alternative pulping 
processes. In the ASAM case this higher number was due to subsequent changes 
in ownership of the t chnology and the corresponding installations and to various 
efforts of the proponents of the ASAM process to gain competent investors for its 
market introduction. In the Organocell case the reasons lay in the somewhat 
sophisticated ownership structure of the companies engaged in the Organocell 
process and in the various creditors involved in as well as companies possibly 
interested in taking over the bankrupt pulp mill company. Otherwise, apart from 
more academic researchers participating in the development of these new pulping 
technologies than in the other R&D projects investigated, a similar low number of 
actors was engaged in developing these environmental technologies, too. 
3. Though to a somewhat varying degree, the successful performance of the R&D 
projects demonstrating at least their technical viability was clearly dependent on the 
engagement and competence of the responsible project leaders. Whereas personal 
controversy was of little importance in carrying out most R&D projects, diverging 
technology management attitudes and correlated personal conflicts among the 
responsible managing directors strongly contributed to the failure of the Organocell 
project. 
Addressing the network character of environmental R&D projects, one can clearly 
distinguish between relatively distinct (though still partly overlapping) knowledge, 
business, and regulatory networks. However, as the network concept presupposes 
more than occasional communication at least between its central members and its 
members belonging to more than one or two organisational (sub)units, only some of the 
actor constellations may be classified as true networks. Other actor constellations form 
at best very loose networks, and thus may be better conceived of as, for instance, 
technical circles or business groups. 
At the general level, a regulatory network involved in or related to the negotiation 
processes around AbwAG and AbwasserVwV annex 19 can be plausibly assumed, as 
described in section 4.3. Similarly, moulded by competition and common lobbying, 
there is a partly European or even international business network consisting of pulp 
and paper producers, their associations, related research institutes, and, partially, 
suppliers of related equipment and customers of pulp and paper products, that focuses 
on pulp (and paper) business issues. As far as one or several general loose (to some 
degree international) knowledge networks can be assumed, these are often closely 
connected to the business network and consist of technical and economic experts of 
pulp processing issues, who are mostly members of the organisations constituting the 
business network and therefore typically tend to advance biased propositions besides 
publishing articles in special (scientific) periodicals. They communicate on the features, 
feasibility and advantages of special technologies, meet in their professional 
committees and at professional conferences, and keep contact to the scientific 
community overlapping with these knowledge networks. 
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Concerning individual R&D projects, it appears more appropriate to speak of project 
teams, and not of (knowledge) networks, which communicate and keep contacts as far 
as necessary with the top management, with competent technical experts (from other 
pulp mills), with suppliers and possibly customers of pulp production equipments, with 
the responsible research project management body, and with environmental 
authorities. Continuous communication and collaboration, however, is mostly limited to 
the members of the project team which - aside from the pulp mill concerned - may or 
may not include participants from other research institutes or consulting agencies, as 
indicated above. Depending on the perceived competitive need for secrecy, the degree 
of professional communication differed for the R&D projects inv s igated.  
Altogether, the actor constellation of these R&D projects typically consisted of a central 
project team composed of 5 to 20 individuals, which was embedded in a wider circle of 
technical experts, on the one hand, and in the project-specific business network as well 
as in the regulatory network, on the other hand, all of them more or less aware of the 
project and its results. Because of the similarity of the cases and the lack of more 
specified network features, it seems justified to presuppose this type of network pattern 
as a rather representative one for environmental R&D concerning pulp production. Only 
the ASAM case reflects features of genuine innovation networks, as described in 
literature (Dosi et al. 1988, Freeman 1991, Kowol 1998), whereas just rudimentary 
forms of them could be found in the other cases investigated. 
6 Interpretation perspectives 
This section summarizes the major factors at different levels underlying pulp-related 
environmental innovations, focussing on the cases investigated. This is done in 
conformity with an interpretation perspective according to which the interaction 
dynamics of structural, institutional, actor, situational, problem perspective and 
strategic capability factors ultimately determine innovation processes. 
Because the innovation processes addressed have not been studied in detail at a 
micro-level, only plausible appraisals and no stringent evidence about the significance 
of the factors denominated here can be given. Certainly, the theoretically crucial 
reference to the interaction dynamics of structural, institutional, situational, framing and 
action-oriented factors of influence which tend to mutually reinforce their impact on the 
innovation processes appears to be a reasonable conceptual assumption (Conrad
1998). Without their substantial description, however, the conclusion that these 
interaction dynamics essentially underlie the innovation processes described remains 
only a plausible hypothesis not tested by empirical reconstruction and evaluation. 
6.1 Structural framework conditions 
Structural framework conditions refer to the manifold (contextual) settings that influence 
the direction and evolution of social processes independent of actors' (current) 
articulation of interests and modes of procedure. Concerning the pulp-related 
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environmental innovations described, these structural framework conditions relate in 
particular to the domains of ecology and health, economics, corporate organisation and 
culture, law, politics and administration, general sociocultural conditions, and the 
(national) innovation system. Without going into their endless description, I summarize 
key contextual settings already described in previous sections. 
Environmental and health problems and corresponding sociopolitical concerns 
mattered as legitimate (rational) criteria to reduce the at least up the 1970s enormous 
environmental pollution by the pulp industry and structure corresponding controversy, 
to negotiate, introduce and strengthen environmental regulation of pulp production 
(emissions), and as potential sources of economic costs caused by (additional) 
environmental protection measures required or losses in market share resulting from 
customer demand of chlorine-fr e pulp and paper. 
Economic criteria and judgements played a crucial ole for corporate investment in R&D 
projects in three respects. First, public co-funding and reduction of wastewater levies 
together with the threat to have to shut down a pulp mill without significant decrease of 
its emissions made this decision in favour of relatively cost-free R&D projects an easy 
one92. Second, fierce competition on the world market and the growing role of 
recovered paper made this cheap opportunity a quite attractive one for existing German 
pulp mills to either improve future competitiveness because of favourable ecological 
performance or to become a more valuable candidate for a takeover within the ongoing 
concentration process in the pulp and paper industry.93 Third, obviously investment in 
the alternative pulping technologies ASAM or Organocell was strongly influenced by 
their economic perspectives perceived by (potential) investors, especially in view of the 
high investment costs for new, economically competitive pulp mills.94 
Corporate organisation and culture clearly mattered because they permitted 
ecologically conscious project leaders to effectively organise and perform their R&D 
projects, on the one hand, and because they reflected the gradual change towards an 
environmentally responsible attitude of the pulp and paper industry (VDZ/VDP 1996), 
on the other hand. Furthermore, changes in corporate culture contributed to the failure 
of the Organocell process in Kelheim. 
The relevant legal, political and administrative framework conditions pertained to the 
(pending) regulatory provision for emissions of pulp production as well as their 
partially flexible local implementation ("lex Kelheim"), the promotion of environmental 
technology development either by R&D programs under the auspices of research 
project management bodies, or by EP investment programs, and the German federal 
                                         
92 Environmental authorities were indeed aware that they essentially bought the cooperation of pulp 
companies to develop environmental technologies by ultimately paying most of thereby incurring 
costs. 
93 Significantly, the reconstruction of the Blankenstein pulp mill received the largest amount of public 
subsidies provided for pulp-related investments in Germany. 
94 Furthermore, the idea to become independent from imported kraft pulp nd related price fluctuations 
clearly contributed to the willingness of the owner of MD-Papierfabriken to invest considerable 
resources in the development of the Organocell process. 
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system of dividing responsibilities between federal, state and municipal authorities. 
Indirectly, the lack or lagging behind of (similar) environmental regulation of pulp 
production in foreign countries or at the EU level was also important because it 
weakened EP objectives to realise strict environmental standards in Germany. 
General sociocultural conditions95 typically tend to play the role of background 
variables where some of them, namely general environmental awareness and the 
eigendynamic of a commitment, once it has been made, probably did support the 
innovation processes.  
The German landscape of R&D institutions and technology policy arrangements could 
well support pulp-related environmental technology development; however, the R&D 
projects under study were primarily carried out by the pulp companies as corporate in-
house projects or in collaboration with suppliers such as Degussa. In addition, external 
(academic) research institutes performed exploratory or separabl  project steps, for 
instance addressing wastewater purification by aluminium oxide (DVGW research unit) 
or lignin utilization (universities of Munich). Thus, the German innovation system 
provided rather favourable framework conditions, but was of no special significance for 
carrying out the R&D projects under study except for the generous arrangements of 
their public funding, what should be counted, however, primarily as favourable 
economic boundary conditions. 
6.2 Actor networks, institutional eigendynamic and situational conditions 
The project-related actor constellations and the resulting quite limited formation of 
(loose) networks have been described in sections 3 to 5. Their main features can be 
seen in 
– the typically small number of actors substantively in olved in the R&D projects, 
– their frequently close connection to and dependence on (changing) business actors 
and, more loosely, to the responsible research project management body, both 
promoting and funding the individual projects, 
– and the regulatory context as solely a significant structural framework condition 
without actual intervention of actors engaged in the regulatory network, except UBA 
(as a research project management body) for launching a project.
Thus, quite some actors shaped the case-specific form of relevant structural framework 
conditions, whereas relatively few actors were actually involved in the R&D projects 
themselves. As a consequence, the competence, engagement, and attitude of the 
project managers and researchers strongly determin d the development path of these 
                                         
95 One may list here the modernization capacity of a society, the importance of the state and public 
policy, the importance of public debate and the equivalent strength of civil society, the extent of 
division into different social classes or strata, the degree of public participation and socio-structurally 
entrenched substantive democracy, the significance of self-responsibility and liability of social actors, 
the degree of legalism, decentralized versus centralized (political) culture and decision-making 
procedures, the importance of postmaterialistic value orientations, environmental awareness of and 
behaviour by main actors and the population in general, and the significance and social influence of 
environmental NGOs. 
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R&D projects. As described below, their final success or failure, however, cannot be 
attributed to these individuals, except perhaps to some extent the failure of the 
Organocell process to some project managers. 
Nevertheless, in spite of the preponderant lack of genuine innovation networks, both 
the institutionally entrenched orientations of the key actors (pulp companies, suppliers, 
EP and ETP actors etc.) within the knowledge, business, and regulatory networks, 
respectively, and the personal commitment of project managers and researchers, by 
mutually reinforcing each other induced some eigendynamic of the R&D projects, that 
stabilised the activities started and therefore at least delayed their termination as long 
as reasonably justifiable, as demonstrated by the ASAM and Organocell case studies 
in particular. Similarly, the project developing high pressure oxygen bleaching for sulfite 
pulping was completed despite its predictable economic unviability, and the projects 
utilizing aluminium oxide for wastewater purification or pyrolysis for distilling bleaching 
liquor were terminated very lately, too. 
Although not mutually exchangeable, situational conditions tend to gain importance if 
structural framework conditions loose significance for the simple reason of thus 
increasing scope of action. Because structural framework conditions largely determined 
the 'if' but not the 'how' of the R&D projects under study, situational factors 
considerably influenced their specific pathway taken. For instance, the small scale of 
paper production by MD-Papierfabriken, the vested interest in and optimism of its 
owner towards the Organocell process, perceived as environmentally sound, the 
interest of PWA to sell the Bayerische Zellstoff AG, the tec nical and personal changes 
during the reconstruction of the Kelheim pulp mill, or the subsidies provided by the 
Bavarian government were all relevant situational conditions in this respect. Similar 
examples could be pointed out for the other R&D projects, too. 
6.3 Varying problem perspectives and strategies for solutions 
Differences in cognitive framing and problem solving strategy clearly shaped the 
bargaining processes around environmental regulation of pulp production, as pointed 
out in section 4. But this holds also true to quite some extent for the R&D projects 
investigated. 
First, they reflect the belief in and the orientation towards the viability and superiority of 
certain types of technological solutions to environmental pollution problems, for 
instance end-of-pipe versus integrated technologies, closure of pulp processing cycles, 
or alternative ecologically more sound pulping processes. Second, they reflect the 
feasibility of different solutions to technical problems (cf. Ravetz 1971). By pursuing the 
fundamental purpose of any technology, namely to fulfill certain function(s), for instance 
environmental protection, the technology to be developed should provide an optimal 
solution to the underlying technical problem so that additional criteria, for example 
efficiency, low costs, few (unwanted) side-effects, are met simultaneously. Because it 
remains always a matter of judgement, at least to some degree, which solution satisfies 
best these various criteria, on principle there exist nearly always several technical 
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options to solve environmental pollution problems, particularly in the predominant case 
of ongoing discovery of new scientific concepts and technical devices. Thus, 
(continuous) efforts to improve technical plants installed or to change and reconstruct 
them completely in order to optimise them according to their purpose reflect the very 
essence of R&D projects.96 As long as these measures did not require considerable 
additional resources and did not lead to other unsolvable problems, they were 
discussed and undertaken largely within the project team only. However, in spite of 
these varied conditions of in principle variable technological arrangements, once 
defined, the R&D projects nevertheless still followed a rather foreseeable technological 
trajectory in the end. 
Thus, one may conclude that problem perspectives and strategies for solution, shaped 
by the economic, political and technological selection environment, particularly 
influenced the selection of R&D projects considered worthwhile as well as the 
acceptance and diffusion of environmental technologies thereby achieved. This 
conclusion again reflects the influence of those promoters and implementers, i.e. 
mainly (large) pulp and paper corporations, who have sufficient resources, power and 
capacity to decide about the development and the (commercial) adoption of these 
environmental technologies according to the cognitive framing and resulting 
assessment of their technical, economic and social viability. 
Because the focus of this study was on technologies of wastewater treatment, chlorine-
free bleaching, and alternative pulping processes, the significance of this cognitive 
dimension of the selection environment and the resulting success or failure of technical 
options can be illustrated as follows. 
Given the significance of wastewater effluents by pulp production and the 
corresponding pressure of EP to reduce them, the availability of basic concepts as well 
as of technical devices to purify wastewater by end-of-pipe technologies, the 
development and, partly, the (technical) failure of several purification technologies, and 
the diffusion of the technically and economically viable ones (combined aerobic and 
anaerobic biological wastewater treatment) were likely. Furthermore, the subsequent 
installation of recovery cycles in the pulping process during the 1980s and 1990s did 
not simply render superfluous biological purification of wastewater from pulp 
production. 
Concerning chlorine-free bleaching, the undeniable health risks of AOX emissions, 
corresponding pressure of EP, the ETP-induced demonstration of the technical viability 
of ECF and TCF bleaching at Alfeld and Ehingen without serious quality deficiencies of 
paper, corresponding preparation of other pulp mills in collaboration with Degussa to 
switch to TCF bleaching, and the subsequent demand of publishers for chlorine-free 
paper led to several R&D projects to develop alternative bleaching techniques, to the 
rapid diffusion of the economically favourable combination of EOP bleaching and P-
                                         
96 The various attempts to install a pyrolysis plant in the Ehingen pulp mill and subsequent substitutive 
measures realised, as described in Klein/Bürkert (1992), are a typical example in that respect. 
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bleaching stages,97 and to the corresponding immediate introduction of TCF bleaching 
without recourse to ECF bleaching because of its perceived economic favourability, 
except for the modified kraft pulp mill of Rosenthal. 
Concerning alternative pulping processes, it has to be emphasized that the existing 
sulfite process was not questioned on environmental grounds, but improved in its 
ecological performance, for instance by the just mentioned environmental technologies, 
and that the kraft process is applied again in Germany since 2000 after its significant 
ecologically favourable modification. Therefore the originally proclaimed ecological 
superiority of the ASAM process and the Organocell process over the established 
pulping processes lost persuasive power. The Organocell process failed to prove its 
technical and economic viability on an industrial scale. Without offering an economic 
advantage over the modified kraft process the ASAM process got no chance to prove 
its technical and economic viability on an industrial scale because of the additional 
investment risks involved in building a prototype of a new pulp mill with a new, not yet 
established pulping technology. Thus, there was much less reason (in Germany) to 
introduce alternative pulping processes as compared to TCF bleaching or biological 
wastewater purification. 
6.4 Patterns of environmental innovation and diffusion 
If one interprets success or failure of the environmental R&D projects investigated in 
terms of their match with a dominant technological paradigm and prevailing 
technological trajectories, the observed patterns of environmental innovation and 
diffusion are in accordance with these concepts (see cf. Dosi 1982, 1988, Dosi et al. 
1988), too. 
They have been developed within the context of innovation research by evolutionary 
economics in order to dynamically couple the classical explanations of successful inno-
vations by technology push and demand pull (cf. Freeman 1974). A technological 
paradigm is "a 'pattern' of solution of selected technoeconomic problems based on 
highly selected principles derived from natural science, jointly with specific rules aimed 
to acquire new knowledge and safeguard it, whenever possible, against rapid diffusion 
to the competitors." (Dosi 1988:1127) Within such a paradigm differenttechnological 
trajectories may evolve, each one defined as "the activity of technological process 
along the economic and technological trade-offs defined by a paradigm." (Dosi 1988: 
1128) Because of this embedding in technological paradigms and trajectories t hno-
logical evolution and change becomes a cumulative, irreversible, and selective proc-
ess. The resulting path dependence generates both stabilisation promoting incremental 
innovations and lock-in effects preventing radical innovations because the latter ones 
question established technological trajectories or even technological paradigms.98 
                                         
97 This does not imply that the various remaining sulfite pulp mills in Germany apply exactly the same 
bleaching sequence nowadays (see Jaakko Pöyry 1997:387). 
98 "Leadership in an old technological paradigm may be an obstacle to a swift diffusion of the new one, 
especially owing to the interplay between the constraint posed by the capital stock to readjustment or 
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One may interpret different pulping technologies as different technological trajectories 
within an established technological paradigm defining their common basic characteris-
tics of the pulping process (debarking, cooking, delignification, washing, bleaching, 
recovery of chemicals and energy, controlled gaseous and water emissions, and 
wastewater treatment), whereas the development of specific new bleaching and waste-
water purification techniques may be interpreted as innovations within the established 
technological trajectory of sulfite pulping. Thus, the introduction of new pulping tech-
nologies such as the ASAM process or the Organocell process can be expected to 
meet more obstacles than the one of new bleaching or wastewater purification tech-
niques, as illustrated by the case studies. 
Technical, economic and market viability of an environmental innovation is certainly 
influenced by their fit to established technological trajectories and paradigms because 
of the already prevailing preferences, the available competence, past investments, and 
veto power of their proponents. However, this viability is not completely determined by 
them, for they provide a competitive advantage for corresponding incremental 
innovations but do not invalidate genuine substantive criteria for assessing it. Thus, the 
use of aluminium oxide in wastewater treatment or the pyrolysis of bleaching liquor 
remained technically unviable under the conditi ns of the established technological 
trajectory. Therefore the patterns of innovation and diffusion investigated can only be 
partially explained by the prevalence of certain technological trajectories in pulping.
If not aiming at explaining, but only at describing technical, economic and market 
(social) viability in order to sketch the innovation and diffusion process of the pulp-
related environmental technologies investigated, that can be done by indicating in the 
following table 4 if they proved their technical feasibility, their economic justifiability, 
and their penetration on the market. 
 
Environmental technology TFa) EVb) MPc) 
Wastewater purification with aluminium oxide (Baienfurt) - - - 
Two-step biological wastewater treatment (Ehingen) + + + 
Pyrolysis (Ehingen) (-) - - 
Peroxide bleaching (Ehingen) + + + 
High pressure oxygen bleaching (Kelheim) + - - 
Organocell process (Kelheim) (+) - - 
ASAM process (Baienfurt) + + - 
a) 
technical feasibility, b) economic viability, c) market penetration    
Table 4: Achievements of pulp-related environmental technologies under study 
                                                                                                                              
productive activities and the behavioural trends in 'old' companies which may embody differential 
expertise and enjoy high market shares in 'old' technologies." (Dosi et al. 1990:23) 
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7 Typical features and summarizing conclusions 
The key features of the evolutionary process towards an ecologically sound pulp 
production to be derived from the three case studies and their general socioeconomic 
and political context, presented in the previous sections, can be summarized in the 
following conclusions. They address (a) environmental regulation and improvement of 
pulp production in general, (b) the environmental technologies investigated in the case 
studies, and (c) the major interaction dynamics directing success or failure of EP and 
ETP: 
1. Pulp production is based on a rather complex set of mutually harmonized process-
ing technologies. That offered many technological options to improve its ecological 
performance within and outside the technological trajectory of sulfite pulping and 
chlorine bleaching established in Germany. ETP contributed significant funding to 
allow for the development of a considerable number of such technological options 
in the 1970s and 1980s. Most of them failed, however, for various reasons, but 
some of them succeeded to become established practice since about the 1990s. 
2. Fierce competition on the world market with substantial price cycles for pulp and 
paper, ongoing closure or integration of existing pulp mills in paper production, 
enormous economic concentration processes with repeated accompanying 
changes in ownership, large investments required for building new pulp mills with 
economically sufficient capacity, and the special situation of exclusive sulfite 
pulping in Germany after the second world war until the late 1990s, together make 
corporate capability (in terms of technical competence, management competence 
and available economic resources) crucial for successfully developing and 
installing environmental technologies in existing or new pulp mills. 
3. EP and ETP played a key role in achieving large reductions of ecologically hazard-
ous substances emitted during pulp production, by introducing a wastewater levy, 
by setting increasingly tighter environmental (emission and ambient quality control) 
standards, and by funding the development of corresponding environmental tech-
nologies. A good deal of coordination of EP and ETP took place that had influence 
on both the standard setting process and technology development. Further 
(ecologically favourable) improvements of interpolicy coordination appear feasible, 
though only to a limited extent. 
4. Despite the politically reasonable focus on end-of-pipe technologies of wastewater 
treatment in the 1970s and on COD and AOX limit values, EP and ETP were aware 
of the pulping process as a whole and were concerned about integrated environ-
mental protection measures closing various pulp processing cycles, as can be ee  
from the AbwV annex 19 and the BREF introduced in 2000. 
5. The competence and engagement of key individuals was crucial for the success of 
both environmental policy and environmental technology development. 
6. Because structural framework conditions, particularly the availability of public 
funds, left considerable scope of action, situational conditions often paved the way 
for starting an environmental R&D project and for its success or failure, as 
illustrated by the case studies. 
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7. Whereas EP activities met fierce opposition of the pulp and paper industry in the 
1970s and 1980s, involvement in related bargaining processes, in conjunction with 
an increasing environmental concern and a corresponding greening of industry in 
general, led to social learning processes of this industry which resulted in growing 
commitment and a voluntary declaration in favour of ecologically sound pulp 
production. A campaign of Greenpeace attacking environmental problems of pulp 
and paper production and public debate on chlorine-free paper probably enhanced 
this change in attitude. However, the actual demand of publishers for chlorine-free 
paper and clear environmental regulations were the main driving forces for 
improved environmental protection and consciousness in pulp production. 
8. Thus, different phases of development with varying attitudes and approaches of the 
main actors towards environmental protection and technology development in pulp 
production can be distinguished: environmental problem pressure and installation 
of available end-of-pipe technologies (1970-8 ), generous public funding of 
environmental technology development and preparation of environmental regulation 
(1975-1985), passing and enhancing environmental standards and diffusion of 
environmental innovations (1980-95), further progress and differentiation of 
environmental regulation and environmental technologies applied (1990-2000). 
These changing contextual conditions implied differing policy strategies and tactics 
of EP and ETP. 
Concerning the environmental R&D projects investigated, the (incidental) focus was on 
wastewater treatment, chlorine-fre  bleaching, and two major alternative pulping 
processes, ASAM and Organocell, developed in Germany, that essentially took place 
at three pulp mill locations, namely Ehingen, Baienfurt and Kelheim.99 
1. Because recycling of waste paper cannot completely substitute pulp as raw material 
of paper production, and because society's growing dependence on information is 
unlikely to lead to a paper-free future, there exist no reasonble alternatives to 
technical fix solutions limiting environmental pollution of pulp production. 
2. Because of the complex setting of mutually harmonized processing technologies 
underlying pulp production, there exist many technical options to realize 
environmental protection measures, but they have to be integrated in these various 
cooking, delignification, washing, recovery, or bleaching cycles in order to avoid 
deleterious side effects of the pulping process. Therefore, the development and 
optimisation process of an environmental technology tends to be a quite demanding 
task with considerable probability of failure. This task needs competent cooperation 
of participating actors, particularly various specialists operating the pulp mill and 
suppliers of technical equipment, and harmonization of technical devices and 
processing arrangements of pulp production.100 
                                         
99 This case study focus on certain pulp mills is due to pragmatic selection criteria and does not deny 
that other environmental technologies with similar objectives have been developed elsewhere, too, as 
demonstrated by the development of EOP-pre-bleaching in the Alfeld mill. 
100  Thus, the bad performance of the pyrolysis plant installed in the Ehingen pulp mill caused the fail r  
of the pyrolysis plant to distill the bleaching liquor and to generate pyrolysis coke. - Thus, the digester, 
supplied by Kamyr, and the recovery boiler, supplied by Steinmüller, did not work properly in the 
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3. The research teams carrying out the R&D projects had and established contacts 
with other competent experts if necessary, for instance to suppliers or to academic 
experts, and they were well connected with the business circles and regulatory 
network relevant for the project; however, these contacts constituted a genuine 
innovation network in rudimentary form, at best.101 Wi h the partial exception of the 
ASAM project academically oriented research institutions were not strongly 
involved in these R&D projects. 
4. Whereas the development of alternative pulping processes can be interpreted as a 
departure from the dominant technological trajectories of sulfite pulping, and 
particularly of kraft pulping outside Germany, the development of new bleaching 
and wastewater purification technologies should be viewed as occurring within 
these trajectories because corresponding basic research and patents frequently 
existed already and because they required fewer changes in the established pulp 
processing arrangements. Thus, the failure of alternative pulping processes at the 
industrial level, despite repeated (desperate) efforts to finally launch them, is partly 
due to their departure from the established technological trajectories, though there 
existed crucial differences between the ASAM process and the Organocell process 
in their technical and economic performance achieved, too. 
5. The need to accommodate a (newly developed) environmental technology to 
various processing cycles in (already existing) pulp mills, and vice versa, too, 
makes it difficult to classify the new bleaching or purification technologies studied 
as still incremental or already radical innovations. They may be re sonably viewed 
as lying somewhere in between. 
6. The diffusion of two of the environmental innovations under study, peroxide 
bleaching and combined aerobic and anaerobic biological wastewater treatment, 
was - apart from their favourable technical properties - strongly promoted by 
environmental standards passed via the 1989 amendment to AbwasserVwV annex 
19. Ultimately, introduction or diffusion of quite a few environmental innovations 
could be observed especially during the 1990s that addressed diverse parts of the 
pulping process and led to considerable reductions of hazardous substances 
emitted, although a large number of environmental technologies developed failed to 
become established at an industrial level. 
Referring to the title of this study, the interaction of world market conditions, corporate 
capability and environmental policy obviously determines to a large degree success or 
failure of environmental innovations in pulp production. Certainly, not all environmental 
technologies developed at Ehingen, Baienfurt, Kelheim, and other places proved to be 
technically viable, but most of them were. Without provision of public resources by ETP 
and effective EP measures towards the reduction of environmental pollution by pulp 
production, at least in Germany the environmental technologies under study most likely 
                                                                                                                              
Kelheim pulp mill, which was due to imprecise specifications or incorrect information provided by the 
project managers of the pulp mill and to the unsatisfactory adaptation of associated processes to 
these new technical devices, but not simply to shortcomings of these suppliers.
101  The network character was developed somewhat more as far as, for instance, the cooperation of the 
Ehingen pulp mill with Degussa or the delegation of small subprojects to university institutes were 
concerned. 
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would not have been developed. However, corporate capability, including technical and 
organisational competence, availability of capital, and competitive advantage, as well 
as favourable world market conditions were equally important for the successful 
introduction and market penetration of environmental innovations. 
Whereas at Baienfurt the economically necessary recovery of aluminium oxide failed 
because of unsolvable corrosion problems of the tubular kiln, the failure of pyrolysing 
bleaching liquor at Ehingen and of the Organocell process at Kelheim was more due to 
insufficient technical management of these environmental technologies, finally stem-
ming from a lack of corporate capability, than to insurmountable technical difficulties. 
The failure of high pressure oxygen bleaching developed at Kelheim was essentially 
due to its economic unviability; this failure cannot be attributed to world market condi-
tions, however, in view of technically feasible cheaper alternative bleaching arrange-
ments though not yet clearly recognizable at the time, when this bleaching technology 
was developed. 
Concerning the other environmental technologies, namely peroxide bleaching and two-
step (aerobic and anaerobic) biological purification of wastewater (Ehingen), and the 
ASAM process (Baienfurt), the first two - with some further modifications - became 
established practice for sulfite pulping, that remained a competitive niche on the world 
market dominated by kraft pulping. The ASAM process, however, has not been 
introduced up to the present on an industrial scale because of situationally missing 
corporate capability and unfavourable world market conditions.102 
                                         
102 The established technological trajectory of the (modified) kraft process, the failure of the Organocell 
process at Kelheim, and the unsatisfactory distribution of ASAM-related patents already largely 
explain the lack of necessary risk capital. 
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